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A TISKET, A TASKET: BASKETING AND
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
LEANDRA LEDERMAN
ABSTRACT
In an income tax system that comported with the economic, or HaigSimons, definition of income, deductible expenses would not face sourcebased limitations. A true Haig-Simons income tax system therefore would not
take the schedular approach of sorting different types of expenses and losses
into distinct conceptual “baskets” containing corresponding types of income.
Practical realities often require departing from the Haig-Simons norm,
however. The U.S. federal income tax system does require individuals to
basket a number of types of expenses and losses. For example, individuals’
passive activity losses can only be deducted from passive income gains. By
contrast, most corporations taxed under Subchapter C of the Internal
Revenue Code are not subject to many of these restrictions. Thus,
corporations generally can deduct their passive investment expenses and
losses from their active business income. That ability allowed the creation of
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infamous tax strategies such as Son-of-BOSS and the CINS contingent
installment sale shelter.
In order to prevent the resurgence of abusive tax shelters, this Article
proposes to extend to the domestic corporate context the passive/active
distinction that already exists for individuals. If corporations were required
to basket their passive-source expenses and losses with their passive income
(such as income from interest, dividends, and rents and royalties, other than
those produced by an active business), many abusive tax shelters involving
financial products would not work. The Article also considers the three
principal objections to the proposal—that it is overbroad, underinclusive,
and too complex—and argues that the proposal is tailored so as to minimize
these costs.
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INTRODUCTION
How should expenses and losses in profit-seeking activities be taxed?
Most people would probably answer that they should be deductible. The
federal income tax generally does allow deductions related to business and
investment activities.1 However, it limits some deductions more than others.
In a tax system that comported with the economic, or Haig-Simons,
definition of income, all expenses and losses connected with profit-seeking
activities would be fully deductible, regardless of their source.2 The federal
income tax frequently deviates from that norm for both policy reasons and
practical reasons that include administrative difficulties and efforts to close
loopholes.
One type of deviation from the Haig-Simons norm involves what is often
termed ―basketing,‖ whereby particular types of deductions are grouped with
the same type of income and are only allowed to be deducted to the extent of
that income. For example, a taxpayer‘s capital losses can only be deducted to
the extent of capital gains (plus, in the case of an individual, up to $3,000 of
ordinary income).3 Basketing generally restricts individuals‘ ability to deduct
passive or investment-type expenses and losses from active-type income, but

1. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 167, 212 (2006).
2. The Haig-Simons definition of income is named after Robert Haig and Henry Simons. See
Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal
Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 376 n.26 (1998). It provides that income is the change in a
taxpayer‘s net worth, after taking into account consumption, or, more technically, ―the fair market
value of one‘s consumption plus change in net worth during the relevant accounting period (such as a
year).‖ Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial Accounting
Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97 GEO. L.J. 423, 431 (2009) (footnote omitted).
3. I.R.C. § 1211 (2006).
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not vice versa. For example, individuals can deduct investment-related
interest expense (such as interest paid with respect to investments in portfolio
stock) only from net investment income.4 Similarly, they can deduct socalled ―passive activity losses‖ only from passive income gains, not from
other income (such as salary).5
The last restriction was enacted as part of an effort to halt the tax shelter
activity of high-income individuals in the 1970s and 1980s.6 The hallmark of
many of these old-style tax shelters was an ―investment‖ in an asset or in an
activity run by someone other than the taxpayer that produced expenses (such
as for interest and depreciation) or net losses, giving rise to deductions that
the taxpayer used to lower tax on other income (typically portfolio or
employment income).7 The 1970s and 1980s tax shelter investors generally
were individuals, so it is not surprising that responsive statutes exempted
most corporations from their ambit.8
The 1990s saw a new breed of tax shelter, the corporate tax shelter. The
new shelters were much more complex than the earlier ones, but many
shelters were easily replicated once developed.9 The newer shelters also
shared with the older shelters the feature of using an ―investment‖ to produce
losses for tax purposes that would shelter the corporation‘s other income,
such as income from its business activities.10 As discussed below in Part II.B,
had the Internal Revenue Code (Code) required basketing of corporations‘
passive-source expenses and losses with their passive-source income, many
of these strategies would not have worked and therefore likely would not
have been developed.

4. Id. § 163(d)(1).
5. Id. § 469. In general, a passive activity is one that ―involves the conduct of any trade or
business, and . . . in which the taxpayer does not materially participate.‖ Id. § 469(c)(1); cf. id.
§ 469(c)(2)–(7) (providing exceptions and special rules).
6. See Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1988). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also tightened up Code § 163(d), completely
eliminating individuals‘ ability to deduct investment interest from noninvestment income. See Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(a), 100 Stat. 2244, 2244–46 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
7. See, e.g., James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles, 55
TAX L. REV. 135, 156–57 (2002).
8. See I.R.C. § 163(d)(1) (―In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount
allowed as a deduction under this chapter for investment interest for any taxable year shall not exceed
the net investment income of the taxpayer for the taxable year.‖ (emphasis added)); id. § 469(a)
(providing that § 469 applies to individuals, estates, trusts, closely held C corporations, and personal
service corporations, but not to other corporations).
9. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Tax Shelters and Corporate Tax Management, 51 TAX
EXECUTIVE 235, 239 (1999).
10. See Mona L. Hymel, Tax Policy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody Listening?, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 615, 617–19 (1998).
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Instead, the government unleashed an expensive, multi-pronged attack on
corporate tax shelters that included significant litigation, specifying ―listed
transactions‖ that are subject to special rules, such as enhanced disclosure
requirements, and increased penalties.11 The government seems to have
prevailed, at least for the moment.12 In part, most companies have a lot less
income to try to shelter given the current state of the economy.13 However,
tax shelters are a recurring problem.14 It is not safe to assume that if the
government has won the battle, the war is over. Requiring corporations to
basket passive expenses and losses with passive income would help prevent a
resurgence of corporate tax abuses by precluding the deduction of passive
losses from active income.
This Article therefore proposes the extension of tax basketing to
corporations in the domestic context. Part I explores the current uses of
basketing domestically in the federal income tax. This part shows that
basketing is often used to prevent what Congress considers to be abuse of the
tax laws, and is primarily applied to individuals‘ passive expenses and losses,
as well as to certain personal expenses and losses of individuals.
Part II of the Article proposes the extension of basketing to corporations‘
passive items. It describes the details of the proposal, including a definition
of passive items that would rely on a section already used by three regimes
applicable to multinational corporations—Subpart F, the Passive Foreign
Investment Company regime, and the foreign tax credit—and argues that the
distinction made by all three of these regimes could readily be extended to

11. See Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the SelfAdjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 585–86 (2006). Professor Raskolnikov explains:
The recent tax shelter regulations (Regulations) identify the most typical features of transactions
viewed by the government as tax avoidance and require taxpayers to disclose all transactions that
possess any of these features (reportable transactions). Transactions that result in large losses,
involve brief asset holding periods, or are protected by confidentiality agreements or by contingent
fee and similar arrangements trigger the disclosure requirements. Taxpayers must also disclose
any of the specific transactions designated by the government as, essentially, illegitimate tax
shelters (listed transactions). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 . . . expanded the
Regulations‘ reach even further, and backed them up with new penalties, including an unheard-of
fine for tax advisors equal to $10,000 for each day of a violation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12. See Victor Fleischer, The Tax Shelter War is Over, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG: BUS., L.,
ECON. & SOC‘Y (Oct. 28, 2006), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/10/the_tax_shelter.html
(quoting former Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Pamela Olson as stating, ―‗The tax shelter
war is over. The government won.‘‖).
13. See Calvin H. Johnson & Lawrence Zelenak, Codification of General Disallowance of
Artificial Losses, 122 TAX NOTES 1389, 1391 (2009) (―Shelters may not reemerge as a major problem
soon, both because [of other] . . . forces . . . and, regrettably, because there may not be much income
needing sheltering for the next few years.‖).
14. See id. (―It would be a major mistake . . . to assume that the tax shelter dragon has been slain
once and for all.‖).
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the domestic context. Part II also discusses the effect the proposal would
have on tax shelters, applying it to specific tax shelters that would not have
worked had the proposed provision existed at the time.
Part III considers possible objections to the proposal. First, it considers
the argument that basketing is underinclusive (not addressing all tax
sheltering). In this regard, it both (1) draws on the analysis in Part II, which
shows that the proposal targets the shelters that are most easily replicated,
and (2) considers possible ploys to avoid the impact of the proposal. Second,
Part III addresses the point that basketing inevitably is overinclusive,
throwing out some wheat with the chaff. Finally, this Part considers the issue
of complexity and, in particular, the possible objection that it is simply too
difficult for corporations to separate their passive and active items. However,
as discussed in Part II, multinational corporations are already required to do
that sorting for several other purposes. The Article therefore concludes that
extending basketing to corporations in the domestic context would give rise
to substantial benefits that likely would justify its costs.
I. TAX BASKETING IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
The tax base of the federal income tax is ―taxable income.‖15 Taxable
income generally is comprised of gross income less deductions, though the
calculation differs somewhat for individuals depending on whether they
itemize their deductions or simply claim the standard deduction.16 Most
deductions can be claimed without basketing.17 Therefore, the federal income
tax generally is not what is termed a ―schedular‖ system, under which
income is routinely sorted by type.18 However, some provisions do limit
certain deductions by requiring basketing.19 This Part discusses the
mechanics of basketing, as well as several major basketing provisions and
the rationales behind them.
15. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (2006) (applying tax rates to ―taxable income‖ of individuals); id.
§ 11(a) (applying tax rates to ―taxable income‖ of corporations).
16. See id. § 63.
17. See Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax
Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499, 566 (1989) (―The use of
baskets to limit deductions represents a significant departure from the long-standing approach of the
federal income tax system in combining all of a taxpayer‘s items of income or loss into a single basket
and thus allowing any loss to offset any income, no matter how unrelated.‖).
18. See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW &
POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 145, 159 (1998) (―Schedular systems consist of a series of different taxes, each with
its own rate, on different classes (schedules) of income, such as wages, interest, rents, and business
profits.‖ (emphasis added)).
19. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18.
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A. The Mechanics of Basketing
Basketing involves the grouping together of related income and
deductions, and is an exception to the general rule under the federal income
tax system of allowing deductions to be taken from income of any type.20 To
understand the mechanics of basketing, first consider a situation without
basketing in which the taxpayer has income of $100,000 from an investment
and a business-related loss of $20,000. The tax treatment of just those two
items (that is, ignoring deductions available to individuals, such as the
standard deduction21 and personal exemption22) is as follows:
Gross income

$100,000

Deduction

<$20,000>

Taxable income

$80,000

That example does not involve basketing; a deduction of one type
(business) was allowed against income of another type (investment). Now
consider an example involving basketing. Imagine that the taxpayer has
$100,000 of business income and $20,000 of investment interest expense. As
discussed below,23 the taxpayer can only deduct the investment interest to the
extent of net investment income,24 and the taxpayer has no investment
income in this example. The taxpayer therefore cannot take the investment
interest expense as a deduction this year. Accordingly, the taxpayer‘s tax
treatment of these two transactions is as follows:
Gross income
Deduction
Taxable income

$100,000
<$0>
$100,000

Note that the deduction in this example was disallowed because of the
absence of income of the same type. The converse is not true, however. That
is, income inclusion is not limited by basketing—only deductions are.25

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
falls on

See supra text accompanying note 17.
See I.R.C. § 63(b)–(c).
See id. § 151.
See infra text accompanying notes 38–42.
I.R.C. § 163(d).
By contrast, in a ―schedular‖ tax system, income typically is taxed only if it is of a type that
one of the schedules, although one schedule may be a catch-all category. See William B.
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Thus, in the first example, the investment income was included in gross
income despite the absence of any investment expenses.
Another illustration of this principle involves the limitation on capital
losses, also discussed below.26 Capital losses are deductible only from capital
gains, plus, for noncorporate taxpayers, up to $3,000 of ordinary income.27 It
is only capital losses, not gains, that are subject to the limitation;28 regardless
of the presence of capital losses, capital gains constitute gross income.29 For
example, if a taxpayer has $100,000 of capital gains for the year, all
$100,000 constitutes gross income.30 If that same taxpayer is a corporation
and also has $110,000 of otherwise deductible capital losses for the same
year, only $100,000 of the capital losses will be deductible.31
In each of the situations described thus far, the basketing requirement
applies to items of particular types (such as investment interest or capital
losses). Basketing can be done in other ways, as well. For example, it could
be done with respect to a specific activity only, so that expenses and losses
from one activity cannot offset the income from another activity, even if they
are of the same type. An example of that is the so-called ―hobby loss‖ rules
of Code § 183 discussed below,32 which allow limited deductions with
respect to activities not engaged in for profit.33 Under § 183, each hobby is
considered separately, so that losses incurred in one hobby are not deductible
from income produced by another hobby.34 Similarly, the ―at risk‖ rules of
Code § 465, which restrict the loss deductions available to individuals and C
corporations for borrowed amounts for which the taxpayer does not have
personal liability or property at risk,35 apply activity by activity.36
Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United Kingdom and the United States, 46
CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 19 (1996) (―Schedular taxation gives nations the option of being highly selective
in the kinds of income taxed, and they may easily use schedular taxation to tax different income at
different rates. The process of assigning income to schedules limits taxable income unless there is a
category for all other income.‖).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 60–63.
27. I.R.C. § 1211(b).
28. See id. § 1211.
29. See id. § 61(a)(3).
30. Id.
31. See id. § 1211(a).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 71–73.
33. See I.R.C. § 183.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 71–73. Whether a taxpayer‘s activities constitute one
hobby or more than one is determined based on the facts and circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 1.1831(d)(1) (2010) (―Generally, the most significant facts and circumstances . . . are the degree of
organizational and economic interrelationship of various undertakings, the business purpose which is
(or might be) served by carrying on the various undertakings separately or together in a trade or
business or in an investment setting, and the similarity of various undertakings.‖).
35. See I.R.C. § 465(a)–(b).
36. See id. § 465(a)(1) (referring to ―an activity to which this section applies,‖ and providing that
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B. Examples of Basketing Rules for Individuals
Under current law, individuals are required to basket several types of
expenses and losses. Typically, business expenses and losses are deductible
from income from any source. Often, passive investment items are basketed,
though the hobby and gambling loss provisions impose basketing on personal
expenses and losses. This Section discusses five major basketing
requirements that apply to individuals and examines the rationales supporting
each of them. The common thread is that, in each case, Congress desired to
limit the deductibility of a particular type of expense or loss from unrelated
income to protect the integrity of the tax base in some way. While some of
the provisions discussed below prevent the deduction either of tax-preferred
items from nonpreferred income or the deduction of personal losses, others
were developed to target abusive tax shelter activity.
1. The Limitation on the Deduction of Investment Interest
Taxpayers generally may deduct their interest expense from their income
from any source.37 However, Code § 163(d) provides: ―In the case of a
taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount allowed as a deduction under
this chapter for investment interest for any taxable year shall not exceed the
net investment income of the taxpayer for the taxable year.‖38 Accordingly,
noncorporate taxpayers, such as individuals, must basket their investment
interest expense for the year with their ―net investment income‖ for the year,
which is ―the excess of . . . investment income, over . . . investment
expenses.‖39 Investment income generally consists of income from
investment property, with specified exceptions.40 Investment expenses are
those ―which are directly connected with the production of investment
income.‖41 Any disallowed deduction can be carried forward until the
taxpayer has sufficient net investment income to take the deduction.42
―any loss from such activity for the taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent of the aggregate
amount with respect to which the taxpayer is at risk (within the meaning of subsection (b)) for such
activity at the close of the taxable year‖ (emphasis added)); see also id. § 465(c)(2) (providing
separation and aggregation rules for identifying activities).
37. See id. § 163(a).
38. Id. § 163(d)(1).
39. Id. § 163(d)(4)(A).
40. See id. § 163(d)(4) (providing special computation for capital gains and an election to take
qualified dividend income into account).
41. Id. § 163(d)(4)(C).
42. Id. § 163(d)(2).
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The legislative history of § 163(d) focuses on the mismatching of income
and deductions.43 In part, that is because if the taxpayer invests in an asset
that produces little current income, but an interest deduction were allowed,
the deduction would precede the income, with the income being deferred
until the taxpayer sold the asset.44 In addition, if investment interest were
fully deductible, an individual taxpayer could deduct investment interest at
ordinary income rates but hold the underlying investment until it appreciated,
giving rise to gain on sale that would be taxed at lower capital gains rates.45
When enacting § 163(d) in 1969, Congress noted:
Since the amount of funds borrowed by a taxpayer for investment
purposes generally is within the taxpayer‘s control, it would appear
that a taxpayer who incurs interest expense for this purpose, which is
substantially in excess of his investment income, is primarily
interested in obtaining the resulting mismatching of income and the
expense of earning that income, so as to be able to insulate other
income from taxation.46
Congress further found that a number of high-income individuals had used
excess investment interest to shelter unrelated income on their 1966 returns.47
The initial § 163(d) limitation allowed individuals to deduct up to
$25,000 of excess investment interest.48 Congress subsequently reduced that
amount49 and, in 1986, entirely eliminated individuals‘ ability to deduct
investment interest from other income.50 Because the deductibility of interest

43. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 72 (1969).
44. See id.; see also Zelenak, supra note 17, at 562 (―The preference concerned in cases to
which section 163(d) applies will usually be the deferral of tax on unrealized appreciation.‖).
45. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 72.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 72–73.
48. Id. at 73.
49. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 209(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1542, 1542–43
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also Flood v. United States, 33 F.3d
1174, 1175 (9th Cir. 1994) (―As amended in 1976, the § 163(d)(1) limitation on deduction of
investment interest was equal to the taxpayer‘s net investment income during the taxable year plus
$10,000,‖ and was limited to the taxpayer‘s net investment income plus $5,000 in the case of a married
taxpayer filing separately.).
50. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(a), 100 Stat. 2244, 2244–46
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also I.R.C. § 163(d) (2006) (limiting the deductibility
of investment interest). ―Investment interest‖ is defined as interest paid on indebtedness allocable to
property held for investment. I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A). ―Property held for investment‖ includes:
(i) any property which produces income of a type described in section 469(e)(1) [in general,
interest, dividends, annuities, or royalties not derived in the ordinary course of a trade or business],
and
(ii) any interest held by a taxpayer in an activity involving the conduct of a trade or
business—
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was critical for many tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s,51 it served as an
anti-tax shelter device.52
2. The Passive Activity Loss Rules
The passive activity loss provisions of Code § 469 apply to individuals
and other taxpayers, including some corporations taxed under Subchapter C,
but not to widely held corporations.53 They require a taxpayer who invests in
trade or business or income-producing activities (other than portfolio
investments) in which the taxpayer does not ―materially participate‖ to defer
the deduction of net losses to a year in which the taxpayer has sufficient
income from those activities54 or disposes of the investment.55 Material
participation is defined as ―involve[ment] in the operations of the activity on
a basis which is—(A) regular, (B) continuous, and (C) substantial.‖56
Section 469 was enacted in 1986 in an effort to put a stop to the tax
shelters of the 1970s and 1980s.57 The legislative history explains:
[I]nstances in which the tax system applies simple rules at the expense
of economic accuracy encourage the structuring of transactions to take
advantage of the situations in which such rules give rise to

(I) which is not a passive activity, and
(II) with respect to which the taxpayer does not materially participate.
Id. § 163(d)(5)(A).
51. See Zelenak, supra note 17, at 509–10 (―[T]he interest deduction plays a crucial role in the
operation of a tax shelter. . . . [T]axable income will be less than economic income if interest is fully
deductible and the related income is not fully taxed because of a preference.‖).
52. Id. at 564 (―Considered together, sections 469 and 163(d) constitute a ‗two basket‘ approach
to tax shelter limitations.‖); see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Anti-Tax Shelter Rules: Protecting
the Earned Income Tax Base, 71 TAXES 859, 867 (1993).
53. See I.R.C. § 469(a)(2). ―Preservation of the corporate sector tax base was not the goal here,
since most passive-type income enterprises traditionally have chosen the partnership form.‖ John W.
Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service
Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REV. 57, 109–10 (1988) (footnote omitted).
In fact:
The application of the passive loss rules to corporations is to prevent the owner from contributing
portfolio income property to a C corporation that would offset corporate passive losses. Thus,
while passive losses generally cannot be used by a closely held C corporation to offset portfolio
income, Section 469(e)(2) permits active income (i.e., normal business income) of a closely held
C corporation to be offset by passive losses.
Kenneth A. Hansen, Strategies to Avoid Passive Activity Loss Limits, 25 TAX‘N FOR LAW. 365, 367
(1997).
54. See I.R.C. § 469(a)–(b).
55. Id. § 469(g).
56. Id. § 469(h)(1).
57. See George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from
History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 218–19 (2001).
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undermeasurement or deferral of income. Such transactions
commonly are marketed to investors who do not intend to participate
in the transactions, as devices for sheltering unrelated sources of
positive income . . . . Accordingly, by creating a bar against the use of
losses from business activities in which the taxpayer does not
materially participate to offset positive income sources such as salary
and portfolio income, the committee believes that it is possible
significantly to reduce the tax shelter problem.58
The passive activity loss rules were in fact highly effective in combating
this breed of shelters because the high-income taxpayers who invested in
them did not participate in the underlying activities; they simply invested
passively.59
3. The Limitation on Capital Losses
Unlike the limitation on investment interest and the passive activity loss
rules, the limitation on capital losses applies to C corporations, as well as to
individuals. Under Code § 1211, corporate taxpayers can deduct capital
losses only to the extent of capital gains,60 and noncorporate taxpayers, such
as individuals, can deduct capital losses to the extent of capital gains, plus up
to $3,000 of ordinary income.61 Noncorporate taxpayers can carry forward
disallowed losses indefinitely;62 corporations are subject to a limited
carryover period, as well as a carryback period.63
An important justification for § 1211 is the taxpayer‘s power to time the
recognition of gains and losses by selling property with built-in losses and
retaining property that would give rise to a gain when sold.64 In addition, the
existence of a capital gains preference provides another rationale:

58. S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 716 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4235.
59. See Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in the
Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1432–33 (2004); see also Peroni, supra note 6, at 3 n.12
(―The enactment of § 469 has undoubtedly led taxpayers and their advisers to place much greater
emphasis on an investment‘s potential for making an economic profit, as opposed to its tax benefits.‖).
60. I.R.C. § 1211(a).
61. Id. § 1211(b).
62. Id. § 1212(b).
63. See id. § 1212(a).
64. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 339 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3235
(―Because taxpayers have discretion over when they realize their capital gains and losses, unlimited
deductibility of net capital losses against ordinary income would encourage investors to realize their
capital losses immediately to gain the benefit of the deduction against ordinary income but to defer
realization of their capital gains.‖); Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (1989).
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[T]o-day the taxpayer pays a maximum tax of 12 1/2 per cent on gains
derived from the sale of capital assets, but is allowed to deduct in full
from his taxable income his net losses resulting from the sale of
capital assets during the taxable year. The injustice to the Government
is too obvious to require much comment. . . . The Government can
collect but 12 1/2 per cent of a gain, but it is compelled to lighten the
burden of the taxpayer to the extent of 58 per cent of his losses.65
However, this concern does not exist with respect to corporations under
current law. Currently, corporations do not benefit from reduced rates on
capital gains,66 unlike individuals.67
4. Hobby Losses
In general, personal expenses are not deductible.68 Personal expenses
generally consist of expenses incurred in activities not engaged in for the
production of income—activities that are neither investment nor business
related, but are engaged in for their entertainment or consumption value.
Gross income does not generally exclude personal-source income,
however,69 and some activities that are primarily personal may give rise to
occasional receipts.
For example, the taxpayer might be an amateur tennis player who
occasionally wins a cash prize, or might breed racehorses that sometimes win
substantial amounts but cost much more than that each year to maintain. The
prizes and awards are included in gross income.70 Code § 183, which governs
―hobby losses,‖ essentially allows expenses and losses that would be
deductible if the activity were engaged in for profit to be deducted up to the
income from the particular activity.71 Thus, if the taxpayer plays tennis and
breeds racehorses, he or she generally can deduct tennis expenses up to the
income from the tennis activity for the year and horse expenses up to the
income from the horse-breeding activity for the year, but cannot deduct the

65. H.R. REP. NO. 67-1388, at 2 (1923).
66. See I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (taxing corporations at rates up to 35%); id. § 1201 (applying maximum
rate of 35% to corporations‘ net capital gains).
67. See id. § 1(h).
68. Id. § 262(a) (―Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be
allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.‖).
69. See id. § 61 (generally defining ―gross income‖ as ―all income from whatever source
derived‖).
70. Id. §§ 61, 74.
71. Id. § 183(b).
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expenses of one activity from the income of the other.72 Section 183 does not
allow taxpayers to carry unused deductions over to the following year.73
Code § 183 replaced a previous section that applied if an individual had
trade or business losses over $50,000 for at least five consecutive years.74
That section, termed the ―hobby loss‖ provision, limited the losses that could
offset other income to $50,000 for each of those years.75 In 1969, Congress
found that the previous hobby loss provision had been unsuccessful and that
the approach used by some courts of disallowing losses as relating not to a
trade or business but to a mere ―hobby‖ was more promising.76
The 1969 House bill would have applied the proposed hobby loss
provision to corporations as well as individuals.77 The Senate bill limited the
provision to individuals ―since it is primarily in the case of individual
taxpayers that the problem arises of a taxpayer entering into an activity to
obtain a loss from the activity which is used to offset other income.‖78
Not surprisingly, the primary use of the hobby loss provision has been to
police the personal/profit-seeking boundary, typically by limiting deductions
incurred in loss-producing hobbies, particularly of high-income individuals.79
However, at one time, § 183 was also used as a tool to tackle the tax shelters
of the 1970s and 1980s by treating shelters as activities not engaged in for
profit and thus requiring basketing.80

72. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(d) (2010) (―If the taxpayer engages in two or more separate
activities, deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either in determining
whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in applying section 183.‖).
73. See I.R.C. § 183.
74. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 71 (1969). Certain losses were disregarded for this
purpose. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 104 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2133.
78. Id. The Report also stated that ―the application of the provision to corporations would present
a number of difficulties, such as its effect on shared facilities provided on a cost basis.‖ Id.
79. See Donna D. Adler, A Conversational Approach to Statutory Analysis: Say What You Mean
& Mean What You Say, 66 MISS. L.J. 37, 115 (1996) (―[S]ection [183] was not designed to prevent tax
sheltering, rather, its purpose when enacted was to distinguish between activities that were personal
hobbies and those that were engaged in with the intent of making a profit.‖); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1832(c) (2010) (illustrating § 183 through examples, including Example 1 (ownership of unprofitable farm
by widow with substantial stock holdings ―could be found not to be engaged in for profit‖), Example 2
(self-publication of philosophical ideas by wealthy stock owner could be found not to be profit
motivated), Example 3 (loss-producing dog- and horse-breeding activities of successful soft drink
retailer could be found not to be profit seeking), and Example 4 (farming activity of factory worker
making $8,500 per year who does much of the farm work himself could be found to be engaged in for
profit)).
80. See Calvin Johnson, What’s A Tax Shelter, 68 TAX NOTES 879, 882 (1995) (―The courts treat
tax shelters as a branch of the section 183 hobby loss rules. Deductions from hobbies can be used only
against income from other hobbies. In the Tax Court, a ‗generic‘ tax shelter is a ‗not-for-profit
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5. Gambling Losses
Code § 165 generally authorizes the deduction of uncompensated losses.81
However, ―[l]osses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the
extent of the gains from such transactions.‖82 The legislative history states
that the reason for the provision was to stop the practice of reporting
gambling losses without reporting gambling winnings as income.83 Professor
Deborah Geier has argued that the limitation on gambling losses of § 165(d)
is analogous to the hobby loss rules of § 183:
The paradigm for both sections is that deductions will be allowed up
to the amount of gross income, but no ―loss‖ (deductions in excess of
gross income from the activity) will be allowed, which prevents the
sheltering of unrelated gross income from tax. The underlying theory
is that both activities are considered personal consumption activities,
not investment or business activities.84
Thus, § 165(d) targets personal activity, unlike several of the other
basketing provisions. In that regard, it is like § 183; though, unlike § 183, it
has not been used to combat tax shelters. In addition, § 165(d) allows losses
from one type of gambling (such as playing craps at a casino) to offset wins
from another type of gambling (such as betting on horse races).85 This avoids
the question required under § 183 of whether these are one activity or two.86
activity.‘‖ (footnotes omitted)); see also Adam D. Chinn, Note, Attacking Tax Shelters: Section 183
Leaves the Farm and Goes to the Movies, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 91–93 (1986).
81. See I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006). Section 165 does contain restrictions on the deductibility of some
types of losses. For example, § 165(c) generally limits the deductibility of losses by individuals to
losses incurred in a trade or business or profit-seeking activity or resulting from a casualty or theft. Id.
§ 165(c).
82. Id. § 165(d).
83. H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 22 (1934) (―Under the present law many taxpayers take deductions
for gambling losses but fail to report gambling gains. This limitation will force taxpayers to report
their gambling gains if they desire to deduct their gambling losses.‖); see also Boyd v. United States,
762 F.2d 1369, 1374 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-704 (1934)).
84. Deborah A. Geier, Cheatin’ Artist Paints a Peculiar Picture, 96 TAX NOTES 1417, 1418
(2002).
85. See 2007 Tax Mgmt. Portfolios: Loss Deductions (BNA), No. 527, at A-118 (―Wagering
activities do not have to be segregated from each other. The combined wagering losses from all
wagering transactions, regardless of type, may be used as an offset against the combined gains from all
such transactions. In effect, this permits the net losses of unsuccessful wagering ventures to be offset
against the net gains of those that prove to be profitable.‖).
86. In addition, as Professor Geier points out, § 183(b) deductions are subject to the ―two-percent
floor‖ of Code § 67, while gambling losses are not. See Geier, supra note 84, at 1418. In this regard, as
well as with respect to the breadth of the activities that can be grouped in one basket under § 165(d),
the gambling loss limitation is more generous than the hobby loss provision. However, the latter
provides a presumption that the activity is engaged in for profit (and thus not subject to a limitation) if
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Each of these basketing provisions provides an example of an effort by
Congress to restrict the deductibility of a particular type of expense or loss. In
each case, the Code limits the deductibility of the expense or loss from an
activity to the amount of income or gain from that activity (or all activities of
the same general type). These limitations therefore reflect a congressional
determination that it would be inappropriate for the taxpayer to deduct these
expenses or losses from unrelated income.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR DOMESTIC CORPORATE BASKETING
Under current law, with limited exceptions, corporations can deduct all
expenses and losses from all income, regardless of source.87 To the extent
that losses exceed income, they can give rise to net operating losses that can
be carried to other tax years to reduce tax liability for those years.88 A
previous article has shown that individuals‘ investment and business
activities are not treated similarly on the deduction side; instead, investmentrelated deductions are subject to many more limitations.89 The same is not
true for corporations. Instead, for corporations, even expenses and losses
from portfolio investments are deductible from income from any source.
Because (1) corporations do not face limitations on the deductibility of
their investment interest under § 163(d) and (2) large corporations are not
subject to the passive activity loss rules, a public corporation with a
profitable business can invest passively in a tax strategy designed to give rise
to tax losses used to offset business income. The basketing proposal
discussed below generally would preclude that.
A. The Proposal
This Article proposes the creation of a single basket for corporations‘
passive expenses and losses—expenses and losses not incurred in connection
with their business activities. The proposal would not be to basket ―tax
shelter‖ items. That approach would require defining what a tax shelter is,90 a
difficult and inefficient endeavor.91 Rather, the proposal would thus function
the activity is profitable for a certain period of time, generally three out of the last five years. See
I.R.C. § 183(d) (2006).
87. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 165(a); cf. I.R.C. 165(c) (limiting individuals‘ loss deductions).
88. See id. § 172.
89. See Lederman, supra note 59, at 1410–35.
90. See U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION,
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 118–19 (1999) (―Limiting schedular taxation to corporate
tax shelters would require a definition and identification of the offending transactions.‖).
91. See Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389 (2010); cf.
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somewhat like Code § 469, which successfully combated the tax shelters of
the 1970s and 1980s without requiring a determination of whether the
passive activity constituted a ―tax shelter.‖92 The passive items covered by
the proposal would encompass capital gains and losses from the sale or
exchange of investment assets, as discussed below.
1. Threshold Applicability
The proposed limitation on deductions would apply to C corporations that
are not subject to specialized regimes. Thus, the proposed provision would
exempt personal holding companies and other entities, such as insurance
companies, that are subject to special tax treatment.93 Like the passive
activity loss rules of § 469,94 losses disallowed under this provision would be
carried over indefinitely and would be deductible from income of the same
type. This would allow current recognition for accounting purposes of a
future reduction in taxes due to a postponed deduction.95 It would lessen the
impact of the current disallowance of the tax deduction by reducing tax
liabilities for accounting purposes and thus not reducing reported earnings.
However, the availability of an accounting benefit should not be enough to
Lee A. Sheppard, Is There Constructive Thinking About Corporate Tax Shelters?, 83 TAX NOTES 782,
784 (1999) (―[A] schedular system would avoid the problem of having to define ‗corporate tax
shelter.‘‖). ―The difficulty with defining shelters is that, like Justice Potter Stewart, we know them
when we see them, but we apparently cannot agree either on what we are seeing or how to describe
what we see.‖ Deborah H. Schenk, Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, Foreword, 55 TAX L. REV.
125, 127 (2002) (footnote omitted); see Calvin H. Johnson, What’s a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES
879, 881–82 (1995). Each definition plausibly captures some manifestation of a tax shelter, but just as
often leaves other manifestations out or brings legitimate tax planning into its fold.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 53–59.
93. ―Special tax regimes often apply to corporations involved in banking, insurance, and the
like.‖ Richard D. Pomp, State Corporate Income Taxes: The Illogical Deduction for Income Taxes
Paid to Other States, 42 TAX L. REV. 419, 422 n.10 (1987). For example, Code § 1361 provides that
the following types of corporations are ineligible to be S corporations: ―(A) a financial institution
which uses the reserve method of accounting for bad debts described in section 585, (B) an insurance
company subject to tax under subchapter L, (C) a corporation to which an election under section 936
applies, or (D) a DISC or former DISC.‖ I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2). The proposal is designed to make
minimal changes to existing law while still limiting corporate tax shelter activity through basketing.
Accordingly, it could subsequently be tightened, such as by extending its applicability to a broader
group of corporations.
94. See I.R.C. § 469(b) (generally allowing ―any loss or credit from an activity which is
disallowed under subsection (a) . . . [to] be treated as a deduction or credit allocable to such activity in
the next taxable year.‖).
95. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 109: ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES 5 (1992) (―A deferred tax asset is recognized
for temporary differences that will result in deductible amounts in future years and for carryforwards.
. . . [A] deferred tax asset is recognized in the current year for the reduction in taxes payable in future
years.‖).
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attract tax shelter investors in light of the disallowance of the tax benefits that
are the primary appeal of tax shelters.
Unlike the situation under § 469, losses disallowed by the proposed
provision would not simply be deductible upon disposition of the item that
gave rise to them.96 This is because the shelters addressed by § 469 generally
allowed acceleration of deductions,97 while, as discussed below,98 corporate
tax shelters generally create noneconomic losses (often by inflating assets‘
bases for federal income tax purposes). In the corporate tax shelter context,
allowing the taxpayer to claim the disallowed deduction upon disposition
would essentially permit the shelter to proceed unimpeded.
To reduce complexity, corporations of a certain size should be exempted
from utilizing the proposed provision, at least until there is some experience
with it.99 To be clear, the exception should not be for passive items under a
separate threshold, because then many corporations that ultimately would not
be subject to the provisions would be required to track their passive items to
see if they reach the threshold.100 Rather, the exception would relate to
capitalization of the business.
For example, the provision could use a definition similar to the definition
of ―qualified small business‖ in Code § 1202(d).101 That section treats as a
qualified small business a C corporation with aggregate gross assets of $50
million or less.102 Because § 1202 determines whether stock issued by a
corporation is ―qualified small business stock,‖ the measurement date is the

96. See I.R.C. § 469(g) (providing rules for disposition of passive activity, including full
deductibility upon disposition in a taxable transaction).
97. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57
TAX L. REV. 137, 154 (2003) (Under § 469, ―[t]axpayers may use passive losses to offset ordinary
nonpassive income, but only at the termination of the venture, thus removing the timing advantage that
is key to traditional tax sheltering activity.‖).
98. See infra Part II.B.
99. A possible objection to the proposal based on its complexity is discussed further below. See
infra Part III.B.
100. Similarly, the two-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions of I.R.C. § 67 in
theory ―relieve[s] taxpayers of the burden of recordkeeping unless they expect to incur expenditures in
excess of the floor.‖ STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 78 (Comm. Print 1987). However, in practice, taxpayers cannot be
sure at the beginning of the year whether they will have miscellaneous itemized deductions in excess
of the floor, so if they want to preserve the option of having the lowest tax liability, they do need to
keep those records. See Sarah S. Batson, Note, Administrative Expenses of Trusts: What Did Congress
Mean?, 59 S.C. L. REV. 551, 554 (2008) (―In order to reduce the record-keeping burden on taxpayers,
Congress simply capped that deduction. This is no benefit to taxpayers who still have to keep records
of deductible transactions in order to determine whether they exceed two percent of adjusted gross
income and, if so, by how much.‖).
101. See I.R.C. § 1202(d).
102. Id. § 1202(d)(1)(B).
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date of issuance of the stock.103 The corporate basketing proposal is not tied
to an event such as issuance of stock, so it would have to use an arbitrary
measurement date, such as the first day of the tax year.
The provision should also employ a threshold designed with the context
of the particular provision in mind, so it need not track Code § 1202. The
threshold for applicability of the proposed provision should be set at least at
the threshold at which a business falls within the Large Business and
International Division of the IRS: gross assets over $10 million.104 That
would mean that the Small Business/Self-Employed Division of the IRS105
would not need to become familiar with the new provision.106 That is, the
$10 million threshold would be more efficient than a lower one that required
both IRS divisions to learn the new provision. Of course, the threshold could
also be higher without raising this concern. However, the higher the
threshold, the fewer corporations to which it would apply, so the threshold
would need to be carefully determined to avoid excessively limiting the
usefulness of the proposed provision.107
2. Identifying Passive Items
a. The Passive Activity Loss Rules and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax
Unlike individuals, corporations are not treated under the Code as having
nonbusiness profit-seeking activity. That is, while individuals must

103. See id. § 1202(c)(1)(A).
104. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Realigns and Renames Large Business
Division, Enhances Focus on International Tax Administration (Aug. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=226284,00.html. This division was previously the Large
and Mid-Size Business Division. See id.
105. For an overview of IRS‘s Small Business/Self-Employed Division, see Small Business/SelfEmployed Division At-a-Glance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=101001,00.html (last
updated Aug. 19, 2010).
106. Given the cross-reference to Code § 954(c), the provision is a particularly good fit for the
Large Business and International Division. See infra text accompanying notes 144–45.
107. The appropriate range would seem to be within $10 million of capital (the Large Business
and International Division threshold) and $50 million of capital (the section 1202 threshold). Tax
shelters are generally most useful to taxpayers with substantial income. However, during the heyday of
the corporate tax shelter era, they were widely marketed:
Evidence shows that KPMG compiled and scoured prospective client lists, pushed its personnel to
meet sales targets, closely monitored their sales efforts, advised its professionals to use
questionable sales techniques, and even used cold calls to drum up business. The evidence also
shows that, at times, KPMG marketed tax shelters to persons who appeared to have little interest
in them or did not understand what they were being sold, and likely would not have used them to
reduce their taxes without being approached by KPMG.
S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 33 (2005).
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distinguish between trade or business and nontrade/nonbusiness activities in
a number of contexts—with more favorable treatment accorded the former
than the latter108—corporations generally do not have to make this
distinction.109
However, there are contexts in which corporations of a specific type have
to separate their passive and active items.110 For example, the passive activity
loss rules of Code § 469, although not applicable to publicly held
corporations,111 do apply to closely held C corporations and personal service
corporations.112
In addition, organizations subject to unrelated business income tax,113
including not-for-profit corporations, are taxed at corporate rates on their
unrelated business taxable income.114 However, that tax generally does not
apply to many types of income that are generally considered passive,115
including interest, dividends, royalties, and many rents.116 Thus, not-forprofit corporations must distinguish passive and active income.

108. See Lederman, supra note 59, at 1425.
109. See STEPHEN A. LIND, STEPHEN SCHWARZ, DANIEL J. LATHROPE & JOSHUA D. ROSENBERG,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 16 (7th ed. 2008). There are
exceptions, however. For example, for a distribution to qualify as a nonrecognition transaction under §
355, ―the distributing corporation, and the controlled corporation . . . [must be] engaged immediately
after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business.‖ I.R.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2006).
Treasury Regulations under § 355 provide in part that ―[t]he active conduct of a trade or business does
not include . . . [t]he holding for investment purposes of stock, securities, land, or other property.‖
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iv)(A) (2010).
110. See Lee A. Sheppard, No Partnership in Boca Investerings Tax Shelter, 98 TAX NOTES 300,
304 (2003) (proposing a ―scheduler system‖ employing a ―portfolio holdings‖ definition based on
Code § 263 or §§ 871 and 881).
111. See I.R.C. § 469(a)(2) (applying § 469 to individuals, estates, trusts, closely held C
corporations, and personal service corporations).
112. Id.
113. The organizations subject to unrelated business income tax at corporate rates are
organizations described in §§ 401(a) and 501(c) and state colleges and universities. Id. § 511(a)(2).
114. See id. § 511(a)(1).
115. There is an exception providing that the unrelated business income tax does apply to passive
income to the extent that the property producing it is debt financed. See id. §§ 512(b)(4), 514.
116. See id. § 514(b)(1)–(3); see also Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the
History and Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1483
(2005) (―[D]ividends, interest, loan proceeds, annuity payments, royalties, rents, capital gains, and
certain other categories of ‗passive‘ income are specifically excluded from the [Unrelated Business
Income Tax (UBIT)] tax.‖). The traditional explanation for the UBIT is to eliminate unfair
competition. Id. at 1488–89. However, Professor Stone has proposed a more nuanced explanation of
the exceptions from UBIT for passive income and income related to the charity‘s exempt purpose:
The UBIT was designed to channel charities away from problematic activities by setting up a
tax gradient that favored income-generating activities compatible with perceptions of charitable
activity. At the taxable end were highly visible activities that challenged perceptions of charitable
activities—active business endeavors unrelated to any charitable purpose. Law schools that
wanted to make Congress uncomfortable by running spaghetti and piston-ring factories would
have to pay for the privilege. At the exempt end were activities more compatible with perceptions

2011]

A TISKET, A TASKET

577

These provisions reflect the reality that many corporations are not
insulated from distinguishing passive and active items. However, § 469 and
the unrelated business income tax do not provide a passive/active distinction
that is as suitable for the basketing context as Code § 954(c) does. As
discussed below, the § 954(c) definition is already applicable to multinational
corporations in three distinct contexts.
b. Section 954(c)
Multinational corporations are required to identify their passive-source
items for purposes of Subpart F of the Code, the Passive Foreign Investment
Company (PFIC) regime, and the foreign tax credit.117 All of those
provisions, which are discussed in turn below, rely on the list in Code
§ 954(c) (the definition of foreign personal holding company income).118
Subpart F is an antideferral regime. Generally, shareholders in C
corporations are not taxed on corporate earnings until those earnings are
distributed as dividends.119 Subpart F is an exception to that general rule.
Under Subpart F, U.S. shareholders of controlled foreign corporations
(CFCs) generally are subject to current federal income taxation to the extent
the CFC earns certain disfavored types of income, including passive
income.120 A CFC is a foreign corporation in which more than 50% of the
total value or total combined voting power is held, directly or indirectly, by
U.S. shareholders.121 A U.S. shareholder is a ―U.S. person‖122 who owns at
least 10% of the total combined voting power in the corporation, directly or
indirectly.123 Passive income includes foreign personal holding company
income, which is defined in § 954(c).124
of charitable activity—traditional, passive investment and active business endeavors related to
accomplishing a charitable objective. Charities willing to ―adhere to the old line‖ of good works
and passive investment were rewarded.
Id. at 1554.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 119–42.
118. See I.R.C. § 1297(b)(1).
119. See id. § 61(a)(7); Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened To Subpart F? U.S. CFC
Legislation after the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 185, 186 (2005).
120. See Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck
in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2001).
121. I.R.C. §§ 957(a), 958(b).
122. A U.S. person generally is any citizen or resident of the United States, a domestic
partnership, a domestic corporation, or a domestic estate or trust. Id. § 7701(a)(30).
123. Id. § 951(b); see also id. § 958.
124. See id. § 954(a), (c).
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The PFIC regime,125 enacted in 1986, was designed to limit the use of
foreign corporations as a mechanism for reducing taxes on portfolio
investments.126 A foreign corporation constitutes a PFIC if 75% or more of
its gross income is passive or more than 50% of its assets (by value) produce
passive income, 127 as defined in § 954(c).128 If a corporation is a PFIC that is
not a ―qualified electing fund‖ (QEF) during one tax year, it generally will
constitute a PFIC for all future tax years.129 In general, a QEF is a PFIC that
complies with certain IRS requirements with respect to which the taxpayer
has made an election.130
Any U.S. person who holds PFIC shares directly or indirectly131 is subject
to the antideferral rules of the PFIC regime. If the PFIC constitutes a QEF,
then the shareholder generally is taxed on a current basis (as a constructive
dividend) on his or her pro rata share of the PFIC‘s ordinary earnings,
constructive distributions from earnings invested in U.S. property,132 and net
long-term capital gain.133 If the PFIC is not a QEF, the shareholder must
calculate the tax on any ―excess distribution‖134 or gain on disposition of the
PFIC shares.135

125. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1235(a), 100 Stat. 2566, 2566 (1986).
126. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1023 (Comm. Print 1987).
127. I.R.C. § 1297(a).
128. Id. § 1297(b)(1).
129. See id. § 1298(b)(1). This provision provides an exception that applies ―if the taxpayer elects
to recognize gain (as of the last day of the last taxable year for which the company was a passive
foreign investment company (determined without regard to the preceding sentence)) under rules
similar to the rules of section 1291(d)(2).‖ Id.
130. See id. § 1295(a)(2) (requiring electing PFIC to ―compl[y] with such requirements as the
Secretary may prescribe for purposes of—(A) determining the ordinary earnings and net capital gain
of such company, and (B) otherwise carrying out the purposes of this subpart.‖).
131. See Treatment of Shareholders of Certain Passive Foreign Investment Companies, 57 Fed.
Reg. 11,024, 11,034 (Apr. 1, 1992) (codified as amended at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602).
132. I.R.C. § 1298(b)(9) (cross-referencing Code § 951(a)(1)(B)).
133. The net long-term capital gain is taken into the shareholder‘s income as a capital gain, while
the other items of income are ordinary income in the hands of the shareholder. Id. § 1293(a)(1)(B);
Treatment of Shareholders of Certain Passive Foreign Investment Companies, 57 Fed. Reg. at 11,033.
134. I.R.C. § 1291(a). An excess distribution is ―any distribution in respect of stock received
during any taxable year to the extent such distribution does not exceed its ratable portion of the total
excess distribution (if any) for such taxable year.‖ Id. § 1291(b)(1).
135. Id. § 1291(a)(2) (―If the taxpayer disposes of stock in a passive foreign investment company,
then the rules of paragraph (1) shall apply to any gain recognized on such disposition in the same
manner as if such gain were an excess distribution.‖).
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The foreign tax credit also relies on § 954(c).136 Under this regime, U.S.
taxpayers are allowed to claim a credit for foreign income taxes paid.137 One
article explains:
Section 904(a) contains an ―overall limitation‖ intended to prevent a
U.S. taxpayer from using foreign tax credits to reduce its U.S. tax
liability on U.S.-source income. Section 904(a) seeks to achieve this
goal by capping the credit at the amount of U.S. tax a U.S. taxpayer
would have paid on foreign-source income.138
Since 2007,139 the foreign tax credit has had two baskets for this purpose,
general income and passive income.140 This ―prevent[s] the excess foreign
tax credits from one basket of foreign-source taxable income from being
offset (cross credited) against the U.S. residual tax liability on low-taxed
foreign-source taxable income in the other basket.‖141 As indicated above, the
foreign tax credit relies on § 954(c) for the definition of passive income.142
Thus, three different provisions require multinational corporations to
separate passive and active income. All three provisions rely on the definition
of passive income in § 954(c).143 Section 954(c) includes ―[d]ividends,
interest, royalties, rents, and annuities,‖144 except royalties and rents from an
active business received from someone other than a related person.145 These
items exemplify passive items. It further includes certain other types of
income, including income from commodities transactions, foreign currency
gains, and notional principal contracts, as well as payments that are the
equivalent of interest or dividends.146

136. See id. § 904(d)(2)(B)(i). The foreign tax credit rules do reflect certain variants on this
definition. See id. § 904(d)(2)(B).
137. See id. § 901.
138. Wright Schickli, Equipment Fee Clauses in U.S. Tax Treaties: The Unmolded Progeny of
Madame Tussaud?, 59 TAX LAW. 419, 439–40 (2006).
139. See Randall Jackson, IRS Clarifies Foreign Tax Credit Limitations, 118 TAX NOTES 114, 114
(2008) (―Changes to the law were made by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, reducing the
number of section 904(d) baskets from eight to two, effective for tax years beginning after December
31, 2006.‖).
140. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1).
141. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its
International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 542 (2008). This approach does not restrict crosscrediting across jurisdictions. See Timothy A. Rybacki, Comment, Separation Anxiety: The
Repatriation of Foreign Tax Credits Without Associated Income via the Technical Taxpayer Rule’s
Joint and Several Liability Provision, 19 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 1575, 1583–84 (2005).
142. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
143. I.R.C. § 954(c).
144. Id. § 954(c)(1)(A).
145. Id. § 954(c)(2)(A).
146. Id. § 954(c)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(a)(4)(i) (2010). However, it does not include
commodity hedges related to the taxpayer‘s business. See infra text accompanying notes 281–84.
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Section 954(c) also includes gain from the disposition of an asset that
gave rise to any of those types of income or did not generate any income.147
That generally would include gain on the sale of stock, bonds, rental real
estate, and the like. In addition, § 954(c) encompasses gain from the
disposition of ―an interest in a trust, partnership, or REMIC [Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduit].‖148
c.

Applying the § 954(c) Definition

As the discussion just above has shown, Code § 954(c) provides a
detailed list of the types of income that are considered passive for the foreign
personal holding company rules and are used by multinational corporations
for several purposes. The basketing proposal advanced by this Article is for
expenses and losses relating to any of these types of items to be basketed
with aggregate income from these sources, so that any deduction for passive
expenses and losses would be capped by the taxpayer‘s passive income for
the year.
Thus, the taxpayer would basket with the income items listed in § 954(c)
any otherwise allowable expenses, losses, and credits attributable to items of
those types. For example, if the taxpayer had interest and dividend income
and a loss on rental real estate, it would basket those three items, so that the
otherwise allowable loss for the year would be limited to the amount of
passive income for the year.
Under this proposal, sales of stock would generally result in basketing of
gains and losses.149 Gains and losses on the sale of subsidiaries may warrant
an exception, however. Section 954(c) contains look-through rules for certain
partnership sales150 and for CFCs that are treated as related to the taxpayer,151
but those provisions are not directly applicable to the question of the sale of a
subsidiary corporation. The proposed provision could provide that if the
taxpayer owns a certain percentage of a corporation—for example, at least
25%, by vote or by value immediately prior to the sale in question, perhaps
considering constructive ownership under § 318152—then whether gain or
loss on a disposition of stock in that corporation is considered active would

147. I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(B)(i), (iii).
148. Id. § 954(c)(1)(B)(ii).
149. Basketing would be done for gains and losses remaining after other rules, such as the capital
loss limitations, are applied. See infra text accompanying notes 155–58.
150. I.R.C. § 954(c)(4).
151. Id. § 954(c)(6).
152. See id. § 318(a) (indicating that stock owned by parties related to the taxpayer within the
meaning of Code § 318 is considered owned by the taxpayer).
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depend on the nature of the corporation‘s income over a period of time, such
as the preceding three years. If 25% or more of the subsidiary‘s income
during each of those years (or its entire existence, if less) consisted of income
of the types provided in § 954(c), a gain or loss on the sale of the subsidiary
would be basketed with the taxpayer‘s other passive items.153
Such a rule would appropriately keep losses on the sale of active
subsidiaries active and thus not subject to basketing. In theory, corporations
might manipulate the rule to create passive gains for basketing purposes, but
that would require substantial passive income for an extended period of
time.154 Corporations could also implicitly elect into or out of this rule by
acquiring or disposing of stock in order to obtain or fall below the statutory
threshold. Stock acquisition has costs, of course, and disposition of stock has
tax consequences.
Although, as this discussion suggests, § 954(c) is complex, it has the
virtue of already being applied by multinational corporations in several
contexts. As discussed below, by relying on an existing definitional section,
and one already used for other purposes by a subset of corporations, the
proposal would add the minimal amount of complexity necessary to achieve
its goals.
3. Ordering Rules
The proposed basketing provision would apply after other Code
provisions.155 Thus, only includible income and authorized expenses, losses,
and credits would be basketed.156 In addition, the proposed provision would
apply after other limitation provisions. For example, if a corporate taxpayer
had a capital gain of $2 million and a capital loss of $3 million, $1 million of

153. Similar rules could also apply to sales of interests in partnerships and limited liability
companies.
154. That income might also subject the subsidiary to rules such as the PFIC regime (the
antideferral regime discussed in supra text accompanying notes 125–35).
155. Like other statutes, the proposed provision would apply before judicial doctrines such as the
step-transaction doctrine. See Lederman, supra note 91, at 418 n.150 (―The results when the
[economic substance] doctrine is applied to [a] hypothetical tax evading retailer—good arguments that
the tax evasion has both a business purpose and economic substance—support the argument that the
. . . doctrine should not be applied without first ascertaining that the transaction technically ‗works‘
under existing statutes and interpretive guidance.‖ (citations omitted)).
156. To basket credits with income and deductions, credits would be converted into their
deduction equivalent. Given a top marginal corporate tax rate of 35%, see I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D), a
credit, which reduces taxes dollar for dollar, would need to be divided by .35 (35%) to produce the
equivalent deduction. For example, at a 35% tax rate, a $100 credit (which reduces tax liability by
$100) is equivalent to a deduction of $285.71. Code § 108(b)(3)(B) provides an analogy: in reducing
tax attributes to reflect excluded income, it reduces credits only by 33 1/3 cents per dollar. See id.
§ 108(b)(3)(B). A 33 1/3 cent credit would offset income of $1 at a 33.33% tax rate.
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the capital loss would be disallowed under the existing limitation on capital
losses of § 1211.157 Thus, as under current law, the taxpayer would not be
allowed to deduct the full $3 million of capital losses for the year even if the
taxpayer had $1 million of another type of passive income, such as interest.
In addition, the $2 million of capital loss that is not disallowed under §
1211 would be subject to disallowance under the proposed provision. That is,
if the loss derived from the sale of an asset that generated dividends, interest,
royalties, rents, or annuity income—or no income at all158—it would be
basketed with the taxpayer‘s passive income for the year. If the $2 million
capital gain was from a passive source, or the taxpayer had other passivesource income of at least $2 million, the proposed provision would not
disallow the capital loss deduction.
Similarly, the dividends received deduction, which allows corporate
taxpayers a deduction for dividends received from other corporations,159
along with limitations on the dividends received deduction,160 would apply
before the proposed provision. Thus, the proposal would not eliminate any
dividends received deduction otherwise available to a corporation. However,
only the taxed portion of the dividend would constitute passive income for
basketing purposes under the proposal.161
B. Limiting Passive Deductions: Effects on Tax Shelters
The goal of the proposal to basket corporations‘ domestic items is to limit
opportunities for corporations to invest in abusive tax shelters.162 Although
corporate tax shelters might be designed to comprise part of an active
business, more typically they are designed as an investment in securities.163
For example, the Contingent Installment Sale (CINS) transaction litigated in
the well-known case of ACM Partnership v. Commissioner164 involved an

157. See I.R.C. § 1211(a).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 144–48.
159. See I.R.C. § 243.
160. See id. § 246; cf. id. § 1059 (basis reduction for nontaxed portion of extraordinary dividends
received).
161. As discussed below, the proposal would also encompass amendments to Code §§ 382 and
384 to limit the ability of profitable corporations to acquire excess passive losses of other corporations.
See infra text accompanying notes 268–69.
162. See Barker, supra note 25, at 25 (―[S]chedular principles have been introduced in the United
States in an attempt to cure perceived abuse and to ensure the integrity of the system.‖).
163. See Lawrence Zelenak, Codifying Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 177, 192 (2001) (―([It] seems likely [that]) most income to be sheltered is
from active businesses, and . . . ([it] also seems likely [that]) active business shelters are much harder
to design than portfolio shelters . . . .‖); see also infra notes 270–74.
164. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
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investment through a partnership in floating rate Citicorp notes.165 The FLIP
(Foreign Leveraged Investment Program)/ OPIS (Offshore Portfolio
Investment Strategy) transactions involved investment through a partnership
or corporation in shares of UBS or another foreign bank.166
These and four other tax shelters are discussed below, to illustrate how
they work and the effects the proposed provision would have. For ease of
understanding, the Article groups them into categories. The first category,
loss-generating inflated-basis shelters, includes four tax shelters of two
different general types. The second category focuses on a distinct type of
shelter, which does not involve a loss generated for tax purposes, but rather
involves a credit, the foreign tax credit. Like the four inflated-basis shelters,
however, it involves a passive investment that would be targeted by the
proposed provision. Finally, this Section discusses a third category of tax
strategy: those incorporated into a taxpayer‘s active business. The proposal
would not effectively target those strategies, but, as discussed below, those
strategies are harder to replicate and thus pose less of a threat to the federal
fisc.
1. Inflated-Basis Strategies
A number of corporate tax shelters involve claiming a tax basis that
exceeds economic investment in an asset—typically stock or another
security—in order to claim a loss for tax purposes once it is sold at its fair
market value.167 Some strategies involve an attempt to ―shift‖ tax basis in
such a way that the U.S. taxpayer investing in the shelter obtains basis from
an accommodating nonresident alien who is not subject to federal income
tax. The CINS and FLIP/OPIS shelters provide examples that are discussed
immediately below. Other strategies involve the transfer of an asset along
with an offsetting liability, coupled with a claim that the asset increases tax
basis while the liability does not reduce it. The contingent liability and Sonof-BOSS shelters fit this paradigm and are discussed further below.168

165. Id. at 239.
166. See Calvin H. Johnson, Tales from the KPMG Skunk Works: The Basis-Shift or DefectiveRedemption Shelter, 108 TAX NOTES 431, 433–34 (2005).
167. Under Code § 1001, the amount of a realized loss is the amount by which the taxpayer‘s
basis in the asset exceeds the ―amount realized,‖ which, in a sale for cash, is the amount of money
received. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)–(b) (2006).
168. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
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a. Basis-Shifting Strategies
i.

Basis Shifting Across Time: CINS (ACM Partnership)

The infamous ACM Partnership case involves basis shifting across time.
In that case, the Colgate-Palmolive Company (Colgate) sold a subsidiary at a
gain and subsequently engaged in a transaction promoted by Merrill Lynch
& Co., Inc. designed to offset that gain with a tax loss.169 The transaction,
called ―CINS,‖170 involved an investment through a partnership in illiquid
securities—floating rate Citicorp notes.171 The partnership sold most of the
Citicorp notes and received in return $140 million in cash plus approximately
$35.5 million worth of notes that had no stated principal amount but provided
for twenty quarterly payments based on the London Interbank Offering Rate
(LIBOR).172
Due to the periodic and uncertain payments under the LIBOR notes, the
partnership treated the exchange as an installment sale without a maximum
selling price.173 It therefore took advantage of temporary regulations under
Code § 453, which applied the installment sale rules to contingent payments
and allowed the taxpayer‘s basis to be allocated across the payments.174
Because the payments spanned six years, the partnership allocated one-sixth
of its approximately $175 million basis to the cash payment it received.175
Accordingly, it recognized in the first year a large gain reflecting the
difference between $140 million of cash received and the basis of
approximately $29.3 million.176 The remaining five-sixths of the
partnership‘s basis was allocated to the LIBOR notes, which, as indicated
above, were worth only approximately $35.5 million.177 When those notes
were subsequently sold, they therefore produced a large tax loss.178

169. See ACM, 157 F.3d at 233.
170. See I.R.S. Notice CC-2005-001 (Nov. 29, 2004). The IRS defines ―CINS‖ as Contingent
Installment Note Sales. See id.
171. ACM, 157 F.3d at 238–40.
172. Id. at 240.
173. Id. at 242.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (―ACM divided its $175,504,564 basis in the Citicorp notes, consisting of their $175
million purchase price and $504,564 of accrued payable interest, equally among the six years over
which payments were to be received in exchange for those notes, and thus recovered one sixth of that
basis, or $29,250,761, during 1989. Subtracting this basis from the $140 million in cash consideration
for the Citicorp notes, ACM reported a 1989 capital gain of $110,749,239.42 . . . .‖).
177. Id. at 246 n.27.
178. Id. at 243–44 (footnote omitted) (―For its tax year ended December 31, 1991, ACM reported
a capital loss of $84,997,111 from its December 17, 1991 sale of the . . . LIBOR notes. This loss
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The tax gain in the early year and tax loss in the later year were offsetting
and did not reflect economic gains and losses.179 Rather, they reflected an
allocation of a small fraction of basis to the first sale (producing a large gain)
and a large fraction of basis to the second sale (producing a large loss).180
The gains and losses were allocated to the partners in proportion to their
partnership interests.181 The trick to the shelter was that in the year of the first
sale, a Netherlands Antilles corporation, which was not subject to U.S. tax,
had an 82.6% interest in the partnership and therefore was allocated most of
the gain.182 The partnership interest of the Netherlands Antilles corporation
was later redeemed so that, in the year of the second sale, the U.S. taxpayer,
Colgate, was allocated virtually all of the tax loss.183 Colgate carried the loss
back to the tax year in which it had a large capital gain from the sale of its
subsidiary.184
The ACM transaction was thus designed to allow a loss on a portfolio
investment to offset a gain on the sale of an active business. As tax
commentator Lee Sheppard has noted: ―Putting corporations on a schedular
system, as the passive loss limitation rules do for individuals, clearly would
have prevented situations like ACM, in which the taxpayer used artificial
losses from a portfolio transaction to offset capital gain incurred on the sale
of one of its operating businesses.‖185
ii.

Basis Shifting Between Parties: FLIP/OPIS

The tax strategies that the accounting firm KPMG marketed under the
acronyms FLIP and OPIS attempt to shift basis between parties.186 They
involve corporate stock redemptions (buybacks) designed to fail to qualify as
sales for federal income tax purposes.187 In general, corporate redemptions of
stock resemble both sales, because the shareholder is selling stock, and
dividend-type distributions,188 because the corporation is distributing cash or
consisted of the difference between the $10,961,581 that ACM received for those notes and the
remaining $95,958,692 basis in those notes.‖).
179. Id. at 252.
180. See id. at 243–46.
181. Id. at 242.
182. Id. at 239–43.
183. Id. at 244.
184. Id. at 243–44.
185. Sheppard, supra note 91, at 784.
186. See Johnson, supra note 166, at 433.
187. See I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129.
188. A dividend-type distribution is a distribution to a shareholder governed by Code § 301; it is
taxed as a dividend to the extent of the corporation‘s earnings and profits. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1),
316(a) (2006).
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other property to the shareholder in the shareholder‘s capacity as such. Code
§ 302 therefore provides a series of resemblance tests to determine in which
category a particular redemption will be deemed to belong for tax
purposes.189 The shareholder-level tests generally treat more substantial
decreases in stock ownership as sales and less significant ones as dividendtype distributions.190 The tests take into account constructive ownership of
stock191 under attribution rules that encompass stock owned by related
parties.192
If the redemption is treated as a sale, the taxpayer recovers tax basis in the
computation of gain for tax purposes just as in any other sale.193 However, in
a dividend-type distribution, basis is not recovered first.194 That presents the
question of what happens to the taxpayer‘s tax basis in the redeemed shares.
A Treasury regulation provided that ―proper adjustment of the basis of the
remaining stock will be made with respect to the stock redeemed.‖195 An
example involving two owners (a husband and wife) provided that when all
of the husband‘s shares were redeemed, the wife—whose ownership caused
the redemption of the husband‘s stock not to qualify as a sale196—was
allocated the basis.197
The FLIP/OPIS shelter took advantage of this ―shifting basis‖ notion. Its
general structure was that a corporation was incorporated offshore and
bought shares in an accommodating foreign bank, such as UBS.198 The U.S.
taxpayer acquired options to buy stock in the offshore corporation sufficient
for the taxpayer to be related to that corporation within the constructive
189. See id. § 302(a) (―If a corporation redeems its stock . . . and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)
of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in
exchange for the stock.‖); id. § 302(b) (providing four circumstances under which a redemption will be
treated as an exchange (that is, a sale)); id. § 302(d) (―Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
if a corporation redeems its stock . . . and if subsection (a) of this section does not apply, such
redemption shall be treated as a distribution of property to which section 301 applies.‖).
190. See id. § 302(b)(1)–(3) (treating as exchanges redemptions that are ―not essentially
equivalent to a dividend,‖ are substantially disproportionate, or are complete terminations of
shareholder‘s interest).
191. See id. § 302(c).
192. See id. § 318.
193. See id. § 1001(a). For example, if a taxpayer receives $100,000 of dividend proceeds in a
redemption taxed as a sale/exchange and the taxpayer has a basis of $80,000 in the redeemed shares,
the taxpayer has $20,000 of gain ($100,000–$80,000) that is included in gross income.
194. See id. § 301(c) (taxing dividend amount before basis is recovered).
195. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (2010).
196. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (―An individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned,
directly or indirectly, by or for . . . his spouse (other than a spouse who is legally separated from the
individual under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance) . . . .‖).
197. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) Ex. 2.
198. See Johnson, supra note 166, at 434.
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ownership rules of § 318.199 The U.S. taxpayer also purchased a small
number of shares in UBS.200 Professor Calvin Johnson has explained the next
steps in the strategy:
Just as Cayman [the offshore corporation] was redeemed out of
UBS, the American purchasers bought an option, under the package,
to buy the same number of UBS shares . . . that Cayman was
redeemed out of. Because optioned stock is considered to be
constructively owned, without regard to whether exercise of the option
was a realistic prospect or not, and because Cayman owned everything
Taxpayer owned, Cayman was not completely redeemed out under
section 302. Indeed, Cayman had no reduction of its ownership of
UBS once constructive ownership was considered.201
Relying on Treasury Regulation section 1.302-2(c), the taxpayer would
claim the basis in the UBS stock that was unused by the foreign corporation
because the redemption was treated as a dividend shifted to the U.S.
taxpayer.202 The U.S. taxpayer then had a very high basis in the shares of
UBS stock it owned, resulting in a large tax loss when it sold its small stake
in UBS.203
This shelter, like CINS, relies on the purchase of securities.204 It would
thus be targeted by the proposed provision, which would have basketed the
claimed tax loss only with passive income. That is, the taxpayer would not
have been able to use the claimed loss to offset gain on the sale of an active
business.
b. Strategies Involving Offsetting Transfers
As indicated above, another way to claim inflated basis besides shifting
basis from one tax year to another or from one taxpayer to another is to
transfer a pair of offsetting items to a corporation or partnership and claim
199. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 318(a)(4) (―If any person has an option to acquire stock, such stock
shall be considered as owned by such person.‖).
200. Johnson, supra note 166, at 434.
201. Id. at 435.
202. See id. Note that the offshore corporation was not subject to U.S. tax, so it was not actually
taxed on the redemption.
203. See id.
204. This shelter is also something of a throwback to the shelters of the 1970s and 1980s in that it
depends on seller financing. See Theodore S. Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of a
Teakettle: Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REV. 263, 265 (1994) (arguing that both the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 included provisions designed to combat
debt-financed tax shelters). The purchase of the shares probably would not have been financed by an
outside lender; the funds never actually left UBS. See Johnson, supra note 166, at 435.
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that the asset increases basis while the liability does not decrease basis. The
contingent liability shelter exemplified by Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States205 and the Son-of-BOSS transaction illustrate this approach.
i.

Contingent Liabilities

The Black & Decker case is a prime example of a contingent liability
shelter. In that case, Black & Decker Corporation (B & D) had sold three
businesses for substantial profits. To shelter the resulting capital gains, it
proceeded as follows:
B & D created Black & Decker Healthcare Management Inc.
(―BDHMI‖). B & D transferred approximately $561 million dollars to
BDHMI along with $560 million dollars in contingent employee
healthcare claims in exchange for newly issued stock in BDHMI (―the
BDHMI transaction‖). B & D sold its stock in BDHMI to an
independent third-party for $1 million dollars.206
Thus, B & D sold the stock in its new subsidiary for its fair value of $1
million, the net amount invested in it. However, it claimed a $561 million
basis in the stock and thus a $560 million loss on the sale.207
The argument for the $561 million basis was that stock basis was not
reduced by the $560 million dollars in contingent liabilities because it was a
liability covered by Code § 357(c)(3),208 a provision that excludes from the
general rule of § 357 liabilities that give rise to a deduction.209 Code § 358
reduces tax basis for liabilities but contains an exception for liabilities
excluded under § 357(c)(3).210

205. 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006).
206. Id. at 622.
207. Id.
B&D thus obtained the equivalent of an immediate deduction for healthcare expenses that would
not accrue until 1999–2007. BDHMI [the subsidiary] may stand to obtain a second deduction
when (and if) the future healthcare claims are eventually paid on behalf of B&D‘s employees,
even though BDHMI acquired neither the employees nor the underlying assets of the business that
gave rise to the contingent liability.
Karen C. Burke, Deconstructing Black & Decker’s Contingent Liability Shelter: A Statutory Analysis,
108 TAX NOTES 211, 212 (2005) (footnote omitted).
208. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, [2004] 2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50,359
(D. Md. 2004).
209. I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
210. See id. § 358(d). Congress subsequently responded to the contingent liability shelter by
enacting § 358(h), which provides for a basis reduction for certain liabilities that did not otherwise
reduce basis under § 358(d). See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
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Revenue Ruling 95-74, a taxpayer-favorable ruling, had applied Code §
357(c)(3) to contingent environmental liabilities, including those that could
not be immediately deducted but rather had to be capitalized.211 However, in
that ruling, the facts were that the taxpayer corporation, for bona fide
business reasons,212 ―transferr[ed] substantially all of the assets associated
with the Manufacturing Business, including the manufacturing plant and the
land on which the plant is located,‖ to the new corporation, along with the
liabilities of that business.213
If B & D similarly had transferred a line of business to its new subsidiary,
that would have been very close to the facts of the Revenue Ruling, and the
IRS probably would not have challenged the transaction. Even the statutory
change made by Congress in response to this shelter, which provides for a
basis reduction for certain liabilities that did not otherwise reduce basis under
§ 358(d),214 contains an exception where either:
(A) the trade or business with which the liability is associated is
transferred to the person assuming the liability as part of the exchange,
or
(B) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is
associated are transferred to the person assuming the liability as part of
the exchange.215
B & D might very well have been unwilling to sell off an active
business or business assets. Instead, B & D transferred liabilities to a new
subsidiary without accompanying business assets and therefore sold a
subsidiary that was not engaged in an active business.216 ―B&D used the

211. See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, 37. Code § 263 prohibits a deduction for capital
expenditures, which generally consists of expenditures that give rise to benefits that extend
substantially beyond the close of the taxable year or twelve-month period. See I.R.C. § 263(a); Jack‘s
Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395, 402–03 (4th Cir. 1979) (discussing ―one-year rule‖);
Blasius v. Comm‘r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 274, 277 (2005) (discussing ―12-month rule‖); see also Treas.
Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f) (2010) (providing a twelve-month rule for intangibles).
212. Rev. Rul. 95-74, at 36.
213. Id.
214. See I.R.C. § 358(h). That subsection provides, in part:
If, after application of the other provisions of this section to an exchange or series of
exchanges, the basis of property to which subsection (a)(1) applies exceeds the fair market value
of such property, then such basis shall be reduced (but not below such fair market value) by the
amount (determined as of the date of the exchange) of any liability—
(A) which is assumed by another person as part of the exchange, and
(B) with respect to which subsection (d)(1) does not apply to the assumption.
Id. § 358(h)(1).
215. Id. § 358(h)(2) (2006).
216. Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 437 (4th Cir. 2006) (―Taxpayer only
transferred the health claims but not the assets generating those claims . . . .‖).
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claimed tax loss to offset tax gains from a prior sale of three of its businesses.
The . . . transaction represented a ‗tax strategy‘ that the Deloitte accounting
firm designed and promoted to some 30 corporate clients, including
B&D.‖217
Note that the strategy in contingent liability cases such as Black & Decker
involved the sale of stock in a subsidiary.218 However, the subsidiary was not
running a business.219 The loss on the sale of the subsidiary would thus be
considered passive under the proposed provision as well. Accordingly, the
proposed provision, had it applied, would have barred the use of the loss to
offset gains on the sale of Black & Decker‘s active businesses.
ii.

Son-of-BOSS

―Son-of-BOSS is a variation of a slightly older alleged tax shelter known
as BOSS, an acronym for ‗bond and options sales strategy.‘‖220
Conceptually, Son-of-BOSS is similar to the contingent liability shelter
described above because it relies on a claim that liabilities are uncertain and
therefore do not reduce the basis in the entity to which they were
transferred.221 The Son-of-BOSS label is applied to more than one type of
transaction, but they all involve transactions designed to produce high basis
in partnership interests so as to give rise to a large loss on sale.222 In Son-ofBOSS, the mechanism for obtaining the high basis typically is the transfer of
assets and liabilities to a partnership.223 For example, one variant is as
follows:
[A] taxpayer purchases and writes options and purports to create
substantial positive basis in a partnership interest by transferring those
option positions to a partnership. For example, a taxpayer might

217. Karen C. Burke, Black & Decker in the Fourth Circuit: Tax Shelters and Textualism, 111
TAX NOTES 315, 316 (2006).
218. Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 432; see also Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d
1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
219. See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed
Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 745–46 (―The taxpayers . . . transferred over liabilities
severed from their businesses (naked liabilities) to generate capital losses from the sale of the Newco
stocks.‖).
220. Kligfeld Holdings v. Comm‘r, 128 T.C. 192, 194 (2007).
221. See id.
222. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax
Shelter, 62 TAX LAW. 59, 62, 64 n.20 (2008) (Son-of-BOSS variants include Currency Options Bring
Reward Alternatives (COBRA), Option Partnership Strategy (OPS), and Short Option Strategy
(SOS)); see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (describing Son-of-BOSS variations).
223. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 222, at 64; see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B.
255, 255.
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purchase call options for a cost of $1,000X and simultaneously write
offsetting call options, with a slightly higher strike price but the same
expiration date, for a premium of slightly less than $1,000X. Those
option positions are then transferred to a partnership which, using
additional amounts contributed to the partnership, may engage in
investment activities.
Under the position advanced by the promoters of this arrangement,
the taxpayer claims that the basis in the taxpayer‘s partnership interest
is increased by the cost of the purchased call options but is not reduced
under § 752 as a result of the partnership‘s assumption of the
taxpayer‘s obligation with respect to the written call options.
Therefore, disregarding additional amounts contributed to the
partnership, transaction costs, and any income realized and expenses
incurred at the partnership level, the taxpayer purports to have a basis
in the partnership interest equal to the cost of the purchased call
options ($1,000X in this example), even though the taxpayer‘s net
economic outlay to acquire the partnership interest and the value of the
partnership interest are nominal or zero.224
The taxpayer then disposes of the partnership interest, and because the
taxpayer claims basis far in excess of the minimal value of that interest, the
taxpayer accordingly claims a substantial loss on sale ($1,000X in the
example above).225 As is the case with the contingent liability shelter, the
taxpayer is not conducting business through the entity. Instead, Son-ofBOSS, like the other tax strategies discussed above,226 involves a passive
investment that would thus be subject to basketing under the provision
proposed in this Article.

224. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, 255 (emphasis added).
225. See id. The IRS Notice outlines multiple arguments against the deduction of these
noneconomic losses:
The purported losses resulting from the transactions described above do not represent bona
fide losses reflecting actual economic consequences as required for purposes of § 165. . . . The
purported tax benefits from these transactions may also be subject to disallowance under other
provisions of the Code and regulations. In particular, the transactions may be subject to challenge
under § 752, or under § 1.701-2 or other anti-abuse rules. In addition, in the case of individuals,
these transactions may be subject to challenge under § 165(c)(2). See Fox v. Commissioner, 82
T.C. 1001 (1984).
Id.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 169–219.
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2. Cross-Border Dividend-Stripping Transactions
Cross-border dividend-stripping transactions are a distinct type of tax
shelter in that they take advantage of the foreign tax credit, which, as
indicated above,227 generally allows an offset against the federal income tax
for foreign taxes.228 The foreign tax credit is designed to avoid double
taxation by allowing a taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar credit to offset taxes paid
to foreign jurisdictions.229 In Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner230
and IES Industries v. United States,231 the taxpayer invested in American
Depository Receipts (ADRs), which are certificates reflecting stock
ownership in a foreign corporation.232 In Compaq, for example:
Compaq purchased the ADRs ―cum dividend‖ for $887.577 million
and immediately resold the ADRs ―ex-dividend‖ for $868.412 million
to the same party from whom the interests were acquired. The
dividend amount was $22.546 million. A 15% withholding tax of
$3.382 million applied, however, so Compaq received a net dividend
amount of $19.164 million. The transaction costs totaled $1.486
million. Thus, at the end of the day, Compaq lost $19.165 million on
the sale of the stock, received a net dividend amount of $19.164
million, and paid $1.486 million in transaction costs.233
Compaq also paid U.S. tax on the gross dividend.234 Before taxes, the
transaction was therefore a net loser for Compaq: ―After taking into account
the loss on the sale and transaction costs, . . . Compaq reported $1.895

227. See supra text accompanying notes 136–37.
228. See I.R.C. § 901(a) (2006) (―If the taxpayer chooses to have the benefits of this subpart, the
tax imposed by this chapter shall, subject to the limitation of section 904, be credited with the amounts
provided in the applicable paragraph of subsection (b) . . . .‖); id. § 901(b)(1) (―Subject to the
limitation of section 904, the following amounts shall be allowed as the credit under subsection (a): . . .
In the case of a citizen of the United States and of a domestic corporation, the amount of any income,
war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country or
to any possession of the United States . . . .‖).
229. McCormack, supra note 219, at 714.
230. 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev’d, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
231. [2001] 2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50,470 (N.D. Iowa 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
232. See Compaq, 113 T.C. at 215 (explaining that ADRs are ―trading unit[s] issued by a trust,
which represent[] ownership of stock in a foreign corporation that is deposited with the trust. ADR‘s
[sic] are the customary form of trading foreign stocks on U.S. stock exchanges . . . .‖). In both Compaq
and IES, Twenty-First Securities Corporation suggested the transaction. See Compaq, 277 F.3d at 779;
IES, 253 F.3d at 352.
233. McCormack, supra note 219, at 761 (footnotes omitted).
234. Id.
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million in income, yielding $640,000 in U.S. tax.‖235 However, Compaq
claimed a $3.382 million foreign tax credit for the withholding tax in the
amount referred to above.236 Compaq thus came out ahead after taxes.
Compaq profited after taxes because of the combination of the foreign tax
credit and the market value of the ADRs ex-dividend. It would seem that the
market price of the ADRs should have fallen by the entire amount of the
dividend once that dividend was paid (that is, by $22.546 million—to
$865.031 million), rather than by $3.382 million short of that (approximately
$19.165 million). Compaq therefore received about $3.382 million more on
the sale than one might expect. ―This seemingly odd effect occurred because
most taxpayers could not use the foreign tax credits. As a result, these
taxpayers actually lost the $3.382 million withheld, so they would be willing
to sell the ex-dividend stock for [only] $19.165 million (the net dividend
amount) less than the original price.‖237
What Compaq did, therefore, was claim a foreign tax credit for taxes it
actually paid but did not economically bear.238 In response to transactions of
this type, Congress enacted Code § 901(k), which has a holding period
requirement for the foreign tax credit.239 This imposes a friction because a
holding period exposes the taxpayer to market risk.240 In Compaq and IES,
the immediate resale avoided exposure to price fluctuations.241
Thus, Compaq and IES were dividend-stripping transactions242 involving
ADRs. As in the case of the four tax shelters discussed above,243 these cases
involved a passive investment that would result in basketing under the
proposal in this Article. That is, each taxpayer would have to basket the
income, deductions, and the deduction equivalent of the foreign tax credit
claimed,244 so the deductions and credits generated in the transaction would
only be available to offset passive income. In IES, for example, where the

235. Id. (footnote omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 762 (footnote omitted).
238. See id. at 714.
239. I.R.C. § 901(k) (2006).
240. See Lederman, supra note 91, at 439.
241. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm‘r, 277 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2001) (―23 purchase
transactions and 23 corresponding resale transactions—of about 450,000 ADRs each . . . were all
completed in a little over an hour.‖); IES Indus. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 2001)
(―The purchase and sale generally took place within hours of each other . . . .‖).
242. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case,
88 TAX NOTES 221, 221–22 (2000).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 169–226.
244. For example, under the proposal, the deduction equivalent of the $3.382 million foreign tax
credit claimed by Compaq would be $9.663 million. See supra note 156; supra text accompanying
note 236.
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taxpayer used capital losses generated in a dividend-stripping transaction to
offset gain on the sale of a subsidiary,245 basketing would undermine the
utility of the shelter. If the transaction were used to shelter gains on the sale
of portfolio stock, however, as it appears was the case in Compaq,246 the
proposal would not impede the transaction, as it is designed to restrict the use
of passive deductions and credits to offset active income.
3. One-Off Tax Strategies
Of course, some tax strategies are not cookie-cutter portfolio shelters, but
rather are incorporated directly into business activity. A prime example
involves United Parcel Service (UPS), which engaged in a restructuring to
put its revenue from package insurance offshore and thus not subject it to
U.S. tax.247 In that case,
UPS . . . form[ed] and capitaliz[ed] a Bermuda subsidiary, Overseas
Partners, Ltd. (OPL), almost all of whose shares were distributed as a
taxable dividend to UPS shareholders (most of whom were
employees; UPS stock was not publicly traded). UPS then purchased
an insurance policy, for the benefit of UPS customers, from National
Union Fire Insurance Company. By this policy, National Union
assumed the risk of damage to or loss of excess-value shipments. The
premiums for the policy were the excess-value charges that UPS
collected. UPS, not National Union, was responsible for administering
claims brought under the policy. National Union in turn entered a
reinsurance treaty with OPL. Under the treaty, OPL assumed risk
commensurate with National Union‘s, in exchange for premiums that
equal the excess-value payments National Union got from UPS, less
commissions, fees, and excise taxes.248

245. See IES, 253 F.3d at 352. IES carried back capital losses from its dividend-stripping
transaction to offset capital gains recognized in previous tax years. Id. Most of those losses were from
the sale of a subsidiary. See Kevin M. Keyes, Evolving Business Purpose Doctrine, in TAX
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2007, at 253, 269 (PLI Tax Law & Estate
Planning, Course Handbook Ser. No. 852, 2008).
246. Compaq used the foreign tax credit to offset capital gain on the sale of stock in a publicly
traded company. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm‘r, 113 T.C. 214, 215, 220 (1999), rev’d, 277 F.3d
778 (5th Cir. 2001). Because Compaq was not affiliated with that company, Compaq‘s ownership
interest in it probably would not be substantial enough to require look-through under the rules
proposed in this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 152–53.
247. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r (UPS), 254 F.3d 1014, 1016 (11th Cir.
2001).
248. Id.
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―Thus, if what UPS did was effective, it transferred the excess-valuecharge income offshore, though the business remained unchanged and the
income ultimately benefited the same shareholders as before.‖249 The Tax
Court found that the strategy lacked a business purpose and economic
substance, and was motivated by tax-avoidance concerns.250 The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the transaction had
both a business purpose and economic substance, but it remanded the case to
the Tax Court for consideration of statutory arguments.251
The basketing provision proposed in this Article would not target
strategies, like the one used in UPS, which are tailored to a particular
company‘s business. However, those shelters appear to be less common than
shelters in which any company can invest.252 Strategies that are tied to a
particular company‘s business are more costly to develop and difficult to
replicate.253 Thus, although the proposed reform would not put a stop to all
creative ways of eliminating taxes on profits, it would address the most
significant part of the problem.
III. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL
The discussion above254 has shown that the principal benefit of basketing
corporations‘ passive expenses and losses only with passive income is
restriction of tax shelter activity. However, it did not address the potential
drawbacks of the proposal. The proposal, although targeted to address much
abusive tax sheltering activity, is not perfect. The likely principal objections
to it are (1) it is underinclusive, not tackling all tax sheltering; (2) it is
overbroad, barring a deduction for legitimate expenses and losses; and (3) it
is too complex. These objections are addressed, in turn, below.

249. Lederman, supra note 91, at 429.
250. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, 296 (1999).
251. UPS, 254 F.3d at 1020.
252. See Sheppard, supra note 110, at 304 (―Doubtless most large-outlay tax shelters occur on the
portfolio side of a corporation‘s activities; it‘s hard to construct a shelter around an active business. A
company could really lose money doing that.‖); Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192 (―([It] . . . seems
likely) [that] active business shelters are much harder to design than portfolio shelters . . . .‖); see also
Sheppard, supra note 91, at 784 (―Of course, under a schedular system, a corporation determined to
shave taxes could design a shelter around a real operating business, but the necessity of having to run
an active business to save taxes should not trouble anyone. (The only active business in most shelters
seems to be the rendering of professional advice.)‖).
253. See Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192 (explaining why active business shelters are harder to
design).
254. See supra Part II.
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A. The Underinclusiveness Objection
There are two principal aspects to the objection that a basketing proposal
will not catch all corporate tax shelters. Professor Lawrence Zelenak has
explained:
It is unclear . . . how successful [the basketing] approach might be. In
some cases, the income to be sheltered will itself be in the portfolio
basket, and thus shelterable by a tax shelter loss in the portfolio basket.
In other cases, the income to be sheltered will be in the active business
basket, but shelter promoters may be able to design a shelter which
also goes into the active basket.255
These concerns are not as troubling as they might initially seem. On the
first issue, as Professor Zelenak goes on to state,256 and as the discussion
above of a number of 1990s tax shelters suggests,257 it seems that most of the
income that corporations have tried to shelter is active business income. This
is not surprising because the main revenue stream businesses produce is
business income. By analogy, the individuals who invested in the shelters of
the 1970s and 1980s often were seeking to shelter salary income,258 which is
why the passive activity loss rules, which limit the deductibility of passive
earnings from another active business to the amount of passive income gains,
succeeded in eliminating those shelters.259 Certainly, putting a stop to
sheltering active business income through the use of abusive tax strategies
would address a substantial problem.
One concern if the proposal were enacted would be ―trafficking‖ in
passive losses and credits, along the lines of efforts of profitable companies
to acquire net operating losses260 by acquiring companies with such losses.261

255. Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192 (footnotes omitted).
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 169–251 and accompanying text.
258. See John W. Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships,
Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REV. 57, 110 (1988)
(Before 1986, ―[t]he public apparently perceived that high-income individuals were using tax shelters
to reduce or even eliminate the current incidence of taxation on their portfolio income and salaries.‖).
259. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Similarly, Code § 163(d), which limits the
deductibility of individuals‘ investment interest to their net investment income, functions as a real
limitation on deductibility. See I.R.C. § 163(d) (2006); Linette M. Barclay & Christopher P.
McConnell, Interest Deductions by Individuals: Tax Planning is Essential to Get Through the Intricate
Maze of New Rules, 19 TAX ADVISER 165, 167 (1988) (―The maximum amount of investment interest
that one can deduct in any year is equal to net investment income . . . .‖). The passive activity loss
rules and limitation on investment interest are discussed in Part I.B.
260. See I.R.C. § 172(a) (―There shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an amount
equal to the aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to such year, plus (2) the net operating
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A company with excess passive losses or credits would have an incentive to
try to monetize them rather than simply carrying them over to the next year,
especially if it was experiencing cash flow issues.262
For companies with net profits, losses and credits would shelter that
income, so profitable companies have an incentive to try to acquire them.
The proposal advanced in this Article only imposes a limitation on the
deductibility of passive items; active losses and credits would still be able to
be offset against passive or active income. Therefore, a profitable company
could use active losses to offset its income, whether or not that income is
composed in whole or in part of passive items. However, the Code defines
net operating loss as ―the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter
over the gross income.‖263 Thus, net operating losses include active losses,
but not losses that would be disallowed by the proposal.
The Code contains provisions specifically designed to eliminate
trafficking in net operating losses.264 However, only one provision, Code
§ 269, currently is broad enough to reach trafficking in net passive losses.265
It provides, in part:
(a) In general. If—
(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October
8, 1940, directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or

loss carrybacks to such year.‖); id. § 172(c) (―For purposes of this section, the term ‗net operating loss‘
means the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross income.‖).
261. See Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 132 (1991) (―Over the years, taxpayers have devised a variety of schemes for
transferring the net operating loss deduction so that it can be used to average income between different
taxpayers, rather than between different tax years of one taxpayer. Congress and the courts have
reacted by erecting a number of barriers to corporate taxpayers‘ trafficking in net operating loss
deductions.‖). I am grateful to Christopher Hanna for suggesting this ploy in the passive loss context.
262. The proposal would allow unused passive items to be carried forward indefinitely. See supra
text accompanying notes 94–95. However, losses and credits that are deferred for specific purposes are
not as valuable as ones that are usable currently.
263. I.R.C. § 172(c). Section 172 is in Chapter 1, ―Normal Taxes and Surtaxes,‖ which would be
the logical chapter in which to situate the basketing provision proposed in this Article.
264. See id. § 382 (limiting the use of net operating losses following an ownership change); id.
§ 384 (disallowing the use of preacquisition net operating losses to offset built-in gains in certain
corporate acquisitions); see also id. § 269 (giving Secretary of the Treasury authority to disallow
deductions, credits, and other allowances acquired in certain contexts, where ―the principal purpose for
which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the
benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation would not
otherwise enjoy . . . .‖).
265. See id. § 269. One commentator has explained: ―Section 269 has been most frequently used
by the Service to disregard the acquisition of companies acquired to utilize their net operating losses or
to gain multiple surtax exemptions.‖ Marilyn Barrett, Independent Contractor/Employee Classification
in the Entertainment Industry: The Old, the New and the Continuing Uncertainty, 13 U. MIAMI ENT. &
SPORTS L. REV. 91, 109 n.53 (1995).
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(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8,
1940, directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not
controlled, directly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition,
by such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which
property, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, is determined by
reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation, and
the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion
or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a
deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation
would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary may disallow such
deduction, credit, or other allowance.266
Section 269 therefore gives the IRS discretion to challenge the acquisition
of tax benefits for tax-avoidance purposes. By contrast, Code §§ 382 and 384
disallow net operating losses more directly.267 Therefore, if the basketing
proposal advanced in this Article were enacted without changing other
provisions, profitable corporations would be more readily able to acquire net
passive losses than to acquire net operating losses.268 To prevent that, §§ 382
and 384 could be amended to bring net corporate passive losses within their
scope.269
On the second issue raised by Professor Zelenak—that ―shelter promoters
may be able to design a shelter which also goes into the active basket‖270—
most of the well-known corporate tax shelters involved passive
investments.271 That is not coincidental; passive investment structures are
much more easily replicated. Sheltering active business income often will
require tailoring a shelter to a particular business or industry, as with the
offshore strategy in the UPS case.272 It is generally less costly to design a
prewired strategy involving securities than to design a shelter built into a
business.

266. I.R.C. § 269(a).
267. See id. §§ 382, 384.
268. One commentator explains: ―Although the subjective test of section 269 enabled the Service
to limit net operating loss transfers in the most egregious cases, the objective test of section 382
proved more successful in limiting such transfers.‖ Michelle M. Arnopol, Why Have Chapter 11
Bankruptcies Failed So Miserably? A Reappraisal of Congressional Attempts to Protect a
Corporation’s Net Operating Losses After Bankruptcy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 147 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
269. An alternative would be to create a parallel regime for net passive losses. However, that
would be less efficient than enlarging the scope of existing §§ 382 and 384.
270. Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192 (footnote omitted).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 162–246.
272. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r (UPS), 254 F.3d 1014, 1016–17 (11th Cir.
2001).
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Putting a stop to the development of corporate tax shelters that can be
purchased ―off the rack‖ would be incredibly valuable for the fisc, even if a
niche market remains for custom ―tailored‖ tax strategies. Professor Zelenak
concludes, for similar reasons, that, despite the concerns he mentioned, ―the
schedular approach seems worthy of further consideration.‖273 He explains:
If (as seems likely) most income to be sheltered is from active
businesses, and if (as also seems likely) active business shelters are
much harder to design than portfolio shelters, then a schedular system
would seriously impede shelter activity, even if it did not succeed in
shutting down all shelters.274
It is possible, however, that if the proposed provision were enacted,
corporations subject to it would respond by trying to convert passive losses
into active ones to avoid the basketing requirement. For example, the general
definition under § 954(c) encompasses interest and dividends, as well as
income from the sale of assets that give rise to passive income,275 but it
provides an exception for ―dealers in securities.‖276 For securities dealers,
items from ―transaction[s] . . . entered into in the ordinary course of such
dealer‘s trade or business as such a dealer‖ are not taken into account, so long
as ―the income from the transaction is attributable to activities of the dealer in
the country under the laws of which the dealer is created or organized.‖277 A
company might consider setting up a brokerage business to avail itself of this
provision, claiming that the tax strategy was considered part of the U.S.
brokerage business, so the loss was active.278 However, in situations in which
taxpayers purchased a cloned tax shelter, such as those in ACM, Black &
Decker, and the other shelters discussed above, an examination of the facts
and circumstances likely would reveal that the shelter was not entered into in
the ordinary course of the securities business.279

273. Zelenak, supra note 163, at 192.
274. Id. (footnote omitted).
275. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1) (2006).
276. Id. § 954(c)(2)(C)(ii).
277. Id.
278. I am grateful to Stephanie McMahon for raising and discussing this issue with me.
279. This inquiry is a concrete one that courts should be equipped to perform. Note that, for
example, Code § 954(c) requires a determination of whether a ―transaction [was] entered into by the
taxpayer in the normal course of the taxpayer‘s trade or business‖ in the context of determining
whether it is a ―commodity hedging transaction[].‖ See I.R.C. §§ 954(c)(1)(C)(i); 1221(b)(2)(A)(i);
infra text accompanying notes 282–84. In addition, setting up a new line of business involves
substantial costs, which would be a deterrent in itself. Moreover, assuming a corporation bore the costs
of starting the new line of business and was successful in its claim that the shelter losses did not
constitute passive items within the meaning of § 954(c), the losses still would not accomplish the
company‘s goal of sheltering profits from its original business if the brokerage business earned profits
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Nonetheless, some taxpayers probably would escape the strictures of the
proposed provision, finding a way to avoid basketing of passive deductions
and credits or a way to convert active income into passive income for
purposes of the basketing restriction. The proposed provision raises the cost
of these efforts, however, and thus would at least serve as a friction that
should reduce tax sheltering.
B. The Overinclusiveness Objection
1. Limiting Overinclusiveness
Another problem with basketing is that some items that are disallowed
might be ones that, in theory, seemingly should be allowed. As the Treasury
Department noted, ―Applying such rules [as § 469] in response to corporate
tax shelter transactions casts a wide net—one that would catch both
taxpayers that engage in sheltering transactions as well as those that do
not.‖280
Importantly, the proposed basketing rule should not apply to hedges of
commodities related to the taxpayer‘s business, such as corn futures
purchased by a manufacturer of cornstarch and corn syrup.281 Code § 954(c)
excludes gains and losses that ―arise out of commodity hedging
transactions.‖282 Commodity hedging transactions are defined by reference to
Code § 1221(b)(2).283 This includes ―any transaction entered into by the
taxpayer in the normal course of the taxpayer's trade or business primarily . . .
to manage risk of price changes or currency fluctuations with respect to
ordinary property which is held or to be held by the taxpayer.‖284 Thus, the
proposal should not apply to hedges of commodities in order to assure a
source of supply of inventory or raw materials, for example.
at least equal to the loss from the shelter. Therefore, if the brokerage business were successful, the
taxpayer would have to increase the size of the shelter in order to receive a tax benefit from the shelter
loss. This would increase its cost and the likelihood that the shelter would be detected. If, on the other
hand, the brokerage business were unsuccessful, that would increase the taxpayer‘s pretax costs.
280. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 90, at 113.
281. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm‘r, 350 U.S. 46, 48 (1955) (describing taxpayer,
which transacted in corn futures, as ―a nationally known manufacturer of products made from grain
corn. It manufactures starch, syrup, sugar, and their byproducts, feeds and oil.‖)
282. I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(C)(i).
283. Id. § 954(c)(5)(A) (applying I.R.C. § 1221(b)(2) with certain modifications). Section
954(c)(5)(A)(i)(III) requires the substitution of ―‗controlled foreign corporation‘ for ‗taxpayer‘ each
place it appears‖ in § 1221(b)(2), which should not be carried over to the basketing proposal. Id.
§ 954(c)(5)(A)(i)(III).
284. Id. § 1221(b)(2)(A)(i).
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Aside from specific exceptions like this one, the overinclusive nature of
basketing is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid without a motive test.
However, adding a motive test would be unwise because motive is inherently
subjective. Motive and purpose inquiries are necessarily fact-sensitive and
thus costly. They also open the door to taxpayer manipulation. Such is the
case with the ―business purpose‖ prong of the economic substance doctrine,
for example.285
The passive activity loss rules of § 469 also operate to deter or disallow
losses without regard to whether the transaction involves an abusive tax
shelter. For example, if an individual taxpayer is a passive investor in
another‘s active business, and the taxpayer‘s investment loses money, the
loss is subject to § 469 even if the transaction lacked any abusive elements.286
This is therefore a cost of the basketing proposal, and one not readily
avoided. The questions this issue raises are therefore how high the costs are,
how those costs compare to the benefits of the proposal, and whether another
alternative offers a more favorable cost-benefit ratio. The costs and benefits
are very difficult to quantify. However, the $10 million threshold for
applicability of the proposed provision will help reduce overinclusiveness
and compliance costs.
Beyond that, the passive activity loss provision offers a historical analogy.
The provision is widely viewed as having eliminated the individual tax
shelters of the 1970s and 1980s.287 That is a substantial benefit, given the
deadweight loss that tax sheltering entails.288 However, given its broad
applicability, it likely has had some impact on passive investing in others‘
businesses, such as deterring individuals from making venture capital
investments.289

285. See Lederman, supra note 91, at 398 n.27, 433.
286. See Lederman, supra note 59, at 1433 (giving example of taxpayer investing in a bakery run
by a partnership).
287. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
288. See Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255,
274 (2002) (―The most easily measured social cost of corporate tax shelters is the cost to promoters
and taxpayers of developing, marketing, and executing the strategies. Such expenditures yield little
social benefit and so may be counted as a deadweight loss.‖).
289. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737,
1767 (1994) (―A start-up organized as a partnership could provide its partners with tax losses.
However, the ability of individual partners to use those losses would be constrained by the alternative
minimum tax and the passive loss rules.‖). Victor Fleischer explains:
Absent unusual circumstances, . . . the passive loss rules prevent limited partners in venture capital
funds from immediately using the losses, as LPs [limited partners] do not normally help manage
the portfolio companies in any significant way. The tax losses in the pass-through structure flow
through to the venture capital fund and then to the LPs, but individuals may not use those losses
immediately to offset taxable income from nonpassive activities.
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In the corporate context, the benefit of the proposed provision would be
analogous to the benefit of the passive activity loss rules: a severe limitation
on sheltering of active income. The dollar amounts involved in tax sheltering
in the 1990s were substantial.290 Although sheltering waned in the 2000s in
the face of a multipronged attack by the government and, more recently,
declining corporate income, this is a problem that will likely resurface once
companies are profitable.291 Although Congress and the Treasury have closed
the loopholes that facilitated certain tax shelters,292 taxpayers will inevitably
find others. Disclosure requirements and increased penalties provide greater
deterrence than previous rules did, but probably not enough. The IRS can
Fleischer, supra note 97, at 154–55 (footnote omitted). That is one reason start-up companies seeking
venture capital may be inclined to organize as C corporations despite the corporate double tax. See
Bankman, supra, at 1754–66 (discussing a number of possible reasons for start-ups‘ use of the
corporate form); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-Organization Law, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 751, 770 (2005) (noting tax incentives of using the corporate form). Because start-up
companies typically organize as C corporations, losses do not pass through, so the provision proposed
in this Article should not reduce the benefits of using C corporations for venture capital start-up
companies. See Fleischer, supra note 97, at 137. In theory, the proposed provision could apply if a
corporate investor sold stock in a start-up at a loss and had capital gains sufficient to claim some or all
of the loss. However, there is almost no market for stock in a privately held start-up corporation. See
Fred Wilson, A Second Market is Emerging, A VC: MUSINGS OF A VC IN NYC (Apr. 23, 2009),
http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2009/04/a-second-market-is-emerging.html. Moreover, most providers of
venture capital are tax-exempt organizations. See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital
Revolution, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 151 tbl.1 (2001) (corporate investors were only 2% to 17% of
venture capital funds in years examined); see also Bankman, supra, at 1753 (―In recent years, . . . a
majority of the investment in start-ups has come from tax-exempt institutional investors, such as
pensions and university endowments.‖); Fleischer, supra note 97, at 158 (―Tax-exempt entities, such
as pension funds and university endowments, comprise the largest investor class in the venture capital
industry.‖).
290. See, e.g., U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-171, TAX SHELTERS: SERVICES
PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL AUDITORS 11, 12 tbl.3 (2005) (estimating that, in 1998 through 2003, tax
shelters cost the federal fisc almost $129 billion); Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1389 (―In
recent years, accounting and law firms have marketed aggressive prepackaged tax shelters called loss
generators. . . . Loss generators can be very large, sometimes producing claimed tax losses in excess of
$100 million.‖).
291. See Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1391 (―Shelters may not reemerge as a major
problem soon, [in part] . . . because there may not be much income needing sheltering for the next few
years. It would be a major mistake . . . to assume that the tax shelter dragon has been slain once and for
all.‖) The article further argues that ―[t]ax shelters could return—perhaps with a vengeance—if the
federal judiciary were to become less receptive to the government‘s invocation of the various
common-law antiabuse doctrines.‖ Id. On March 30, 2010, Congress added § 7701(o) to ―clarify‖ the
judicially developed economic substance doctrine. See Monte A. Jackel, Dawn of a New Era:
Congress Codifies Economic Substance, 127 TAX NOTES 289, 289 n.2 (2010). Although the new
provision may foster uniformity in the application of the doctrine, it does not eliminate the substantive
problems with the doctrine. See generally Lederman, supra note 91 (arguing that the economic
substance doctrine‘s focus on taxpayer intent and the prospect of pretax profit renders the doctrine
easy for taxpayers to manipulate).
292. For example, Congress enacted § 358(h) to shut down the contingent liability shelter. See
Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629,
1637 n.30 (2009).
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easily become overburdened with the volume of disclosures, particularly in
the face of incentives for both the risk averse and the aggressive to engage in
overdisclosure.293 And even the higher penalties are not substantial enough to
provide adequate deterrence unless audit rates are increased to unrealistic
levels.294 The revised Circular 230 rules, designed to limit the use of tax
opinions as ―penalty insurance‖ for shelters,295 similarly are helpful but
insufficient if the penalty itself is an insufficient deterrent.
The costs of the corporate basketing proposal would also be analogous to
those of the passive activity loss rules. That is, the proposal would raise the
cost of corporate passive investment by reducing deductions available for
expenses (such as interest paid) and losses. However, because the proposal
only disallows passive deductions in excess of passive income, it should have
a somewhat limited deterrent effect on investments designed to produce
income. That is, the proposal should effectively deter investments designed
to produce losses (tax strategies). However, for real investments, such as
straightforward purchases of stock, the taxpayer would need to discount the
cost of the provision by the probability it would apply. For example, a stock
purchase on margin (thus incurring interest expense), might have only a
relatively small probability of returning income less than the interest expense.
2. A Possible Alternative
Thus, the analogy of the passive activity loss rules and the corporate
context itself suggest that the overinclusive aspect of basketing imposes costs
that are small in comparison to the benefits basketing offers. Nonetheless,
such a rule does impose costs, so the next question is whether there is an
option with a more favorable cost-benefit ratio. Commentators have noted
that there does not seem to be a ―silver bullet‖ that would address all
corporate tax shelters.296 However, Calvin Johnson and Lawrence Zelenak

293. See generally id. (arguing that overdisclosure can be used to reduce the possibility that the
government will detect abusive tax strategies).
294. See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1465 (2003) (showing that, for example ―an audit rate of 1% would require a
$99,000 penalty‖—a penalty of 990%—for the expected value to equal payment of $1,000 of tax).
Even the 30% penalty under Code § 6662A for undisclosed ―listed . . . transactions‖ makes the
expected value of cheating equal the expected value of compliance only at a 76.9% audit rate: $1,000
of tax due is equivalent to 76.9% of $1,300 ($1,000 of tax plus a $300 penalty). I.R.C. § 6662A(c)
(2006).
295. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2009).
296. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1951 (2005) (―What is wanted is a silver bullet (or perhaps a broadspectrum antibiotic) that would kill a wide variety of tax shelters, and do so in such a way that the
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have proposed an amendment to Code § 165 that would address the
deduction of noneconomic losses. Their proposal is to add to § 165(b) the
following language:
―No deduction shall be allowed for any loss claimed to have been
incurred in connection with any transaction or series of transactions
except to the extent that such loss accurately reflects a reduction in the
taxpayer‘s net worth. Losses not allowed in a particular year under this
paragraph may be allowed in a later year, when and if they reflect a
measured reduction in net worth.‖297
That proposal is a useful one, but, by its terms, it is limited to losses. It
does not address the deductibility of expenses or the allowance of credits.
Thus, although it would be very useful to address loss-generating shelters,
including the four inflated-basis strategies discussed above, it would not
target tax strategies such as the foreign tax credit strategy in Compaq and
IES, which made use of the foreign tax credit.298 Although that strategy has
since been limited statutorily, it provides an example of a corporate tax
shelter that is not a loss generator.
The Johnson and Zelenak proposal would thus not have quite the breadth
of the basketing provision proposed in this Article. Its benefits would
therefore not be as substantial. It would therefore also not entail the same
costs. However, it would also have costs the basketing proposal would not
have. Most importantly, the proposal would seem to require measuring the
taxpayer‘s net worth before and after a transaction in order to determine if
and when the taxpayer‘s net worth has declined. For many taxpayers, that
would be a challenging endeavor, given the complexity of their finances and
the complexity of the transactions in question. After-the-fact reconstruction
of net worth by the IRS might also be more complex than applying a
basketing provision because of disputes over what items affect net worth, and
to what extent.299
government would no longer always be playing catch up . . . . It is not immediately obvious, however,
how that might be done.‖).
297. Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1392. The proposal would allow for exceptions:
[T]he proposal would give Treasury the authority to identify those situations by regulation and to
exempt them from the application of new section 165(b)(2). There is a precedent for this
approach; Treasury has successfully written partnership antiabuse rules, with many examples of
transactions considered abusive and transactions specifically allowed. Also, Congress could, if it
wanted, include in the legislation its own listing of particular types of artificial losses that are not
subject to disallowance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 227–41.
299. For example, depreciation is accelerated for tax purposes. See Christopher H. Hanna, The
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In addition, the Johnson and Zelenak proposal appears to apply to all
taxpayers, not just corporations.300 That would increase the compliance cost
taxpayers face. For example, it would apply to individuals, although tax
sheltering by individuals has not been a substantial problem since 1986 in
light of the passive activity loss rules and other rules,301 such as the limitation
on interest of § 163(d) and the at-risk rules of § 465.302 Finally, the proposal
has another scope issue, which is that it does not have a de minimis
exception, so even low-income taxpayers and small corporations would need
to apply it.
C. The Complexity Objection: Segregating Corporations’ Passive and
Active Items
Most new tax provisions add some amount of complexity to an already
complicated set of rules. The proposed provision is no exception. The
specific complexity it would add is a requirement that corporations subject to
it identify and segregate their passive items. The asset-based threshold303
would eliminate that burden for small corporations, but large corporations
would still bear it. Of course, it is important to note, as mentioned above,304
that multinational corporations are already required to sort their passive and
active items for several other purposes and that the proposed provision would
rely on the same definitional section. However, the proposal would require
large domestic corporations to sort out items that previously had been
bundled.
The Treasury raised the complexity concern about basketing in a 1999
white paper, stating:
Real Value of Tax Deferral, 61 FLA. L. REV. 203, 228 (2009) (―Under the Code, a corporation may
depreciate tangible personal property under an accelerated method of depreciation.‖). How does that
affect net worth? Litigation on the IRS‘s application of the ―net worth‖ method of reconstructing a
taxpayer‘s income where the taxpayer‘s records were inadequate or do not accurately reflect income
suggests how complex net worth calculations can be. See, e.g., Erickson v. Comm‘r, 937 F.2d 1548,
1550–52 (10th Cir. 1991) (analyzing whether the cost of marijuana should be included in the
Commission‘s determination of net worth); United States v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915, 922–23 (6th Cir.
1990) (examining whether an airplane legally titled to a corporation should increase its sole
shareholder‘s net worth); Estate of Upshaw v. Comm‘r, 416 F.2d 737, 743–44 (7th Cir. 1969)
(analyzing whether accrued federal income tax liabilities reduce net worth).
300. See Johnson & Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1392.
301. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
302. See I.R.C. §§ 163(d), 465 (2006); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text; supra text
accompanying note 35.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 100–03.
304. See supra text accompanying note 117.
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A broad basketing or schedular system limited to corporate tax
shelters would be difficult to design, implement and enforce. Unlike
individuals, corporations engage in a wide variety of activities and
often grow and diversify into new activities. Because money is
fungible, tracing tax benefits derived from financing transactions to
taxable income from activities for which the financing is used (and
vice versa) would be difficult.305
The Treasury‘s comparison suggests that basketing is more complex for
corporations than for individuals because corporations engage in a broader
range of activities. In one sense, individuals may engage in a broader range
of activities than corporations because, like corporations, they engage in
business activities as well as nonbusiness profit-seeking (investment-type)
activities,306 but, unlike corporations, they engage in personal activities as
well. In fact, individuals often need to distinguish among those items,
whether for basketing purposes, as discussed above,307 or because of
limitations on or disallowance of deductions of a particular type. For
example, an individual with deductible nonemployee business expenses can
deduct them above the line308 but must treat expenses to produce most
investment income as disfavored ―miscellaneous itemized deductions.‖309 An
individual‘s personal expenses generally are not deductible at all.310
Yet, in another sense, corporations may engage in a broader range of
activities than individuals because they can more easily expand into a range
of activities that require large numbers of workers. However, corporations
doing that typically will have more sophisticated record-keeping systems
305. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 90, at 118. The white paper also stated: ―Limiting
schedular taxation to corporate tax shelters would require a definition and identification of the
offending transactions.‖ Id. at 118–19. That concern does not apply to the proposal that is the subject
of this Article because basketing would not be limited to tax shelter transactions. See supra text
accompanying notes 90–92.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 108–09.
307. See supra Part I.B.
308. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1).
309. See id. §§ 62(a), 67(b). Miscellaneous itemized deductions are subject to a number of
limitations on their deductibility. See id. § 63 (providing individual taxpayer with a choice between
itemizing and claiming standard deduction); id. § 67 (2% floor on itemized deductions); id. § 68
(overall limitation on itemized deductions). As these limitations suggest, an individual‘s trade or
business activity is often privileged over nonbusiness profit-seeking activity. See Lederman, supra
note 59, at 1450. Under case law, the distinction between the two types of profit-seeking endeavors is
whether the activity is sufficiently ―active.‖ See id. (―To square Higgins [v. Comm‘r, 312 U.S. 212
(1941)] with [Comm‘r v.] Groetzinger, [480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987),] the focus must be on the ‗active‘ or
‗passive‘ nature of the taxpayer‘s earnings.‖).
310. See I.R.C. § 262 (providing general rule that ―no deduction shall be allowed for personal,
living, or family expenses.‖).
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than individuals with fewer activities. Those record-keeping systems
facilitate compliance with the tax laws.
It is true that any rule that distinguishes among distinct types of items
requires some sorting and tracing. However, it is very possible for
corporations to do that in the passive/active context. As discussed above,
multinational corporations are already required to do so in at least three
contexts311: Subpart F of the Code requires separation of the passive and
active income of each CFC, because the passive income is taxed currently,
while active income is taxed only upon repatriation;312 the PFIC regime
requires identification of a foreign corporation‘s passive and active income
and assets in order to determine whether the corporation is a PFIC, which
subjects U.S. shareholders to antideferral tax rules;313 and the foreign tax
credit regime requires separation of passive income into a distinct basket
from other income, so as to prohibit cross-crediting across categories.314
Large domestic corporations should be equally well equipped to identify the
passive items that fall within the § 954(c) definition and separate them out
from their other items.
CONCLUSION
In the federal income tax, basketing of deductions with related income is
an exception to the general rule that deductions can be taken from any
income, regardless of source. It is nonetheless used fairly frequently in the
individual federal income tax to prevent deductions from reducing tax on
unrelated income. Some of the basketing provisions applicable to individuals
function, at least in part, as anti-tax-shelter devices.
Many of the basketing provisions applicable to individuals could, in
theory, apply to corporate taxpayers, though they generally do not.
Conceptually, there is no reason why corporate expenses and losses could not
be subject to basketing. In fact, many of the cookie-cutter corporate tax
shelters developed in the 1990s would not have worked if corporations‘
passive losses were only allowed to offset passive income.
Basketing does not work perfectly to disallow only tax shelter items. As
the passive activity loss rules of Code § 469 illustrate,315 basketing does not
capture all tax shelters, and it also sweeps in some bona fide investments.

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See supra Part II.A.2.b–c.
See generally supra notes 136–42 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 117–30.
See supra text accompanying notes 139–41.
I.R.C. § 469 (2006).
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However, as § 469 illustrates,316 basketing can be quite effective in curbing
tax shelters without impeding much legitimate activity. The proposed
provision would work similarly because it would exempt from its ambit
corporations with relatively low capitalization, which likely do not have the
resources to invest in tax shelters, and it would allow unused losses to be
carried forward.
Basketing does add complexity, but corporate taxpayers typically are
better suited to bear that complexity than most individuals are. Multinational
corporations already are required to identify and separate passive-source
income for many purposes. The proposal would use the same definition for
passive income items and require C corporations to identify expenses and
losses of the same types for basketing purposes. It would therefore introduce
the minimal additional complexity needed for this type of basketing.
The benefits of the proposal would be analogous to the benefits of the
―passive activity loss‖ rules of Code § 469: the proposed provision would
severely restrict the deductibility of tax shelter losses from other income.
Corporations could still develop methods to remove income from the federal
tax base, but those techniques typically are more specialized and thus have a
lower return on investment to promoters and a lower cost to the federal fisc.
Most importantly, corporations would no longer be able to use investments in
securities to lower the tax rate on either their business income or gains from
the sale of businesses. Unless they had substantial income from passive
sources such as dividends and interest, passive losses simply would do them
no good. The proposal would therefore help prevent a resurgence of the
corporate tax shelter problem.

316. Id.

